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In the twentieth century, Delaware corporate law has swept the nation.
Delaware’s enabling philosophy of corporate law seeks to maximize
managerial flexibility.1 Because managers usually determine the state of
incorporation, it comes as no surprise that Delaware is the domicile of choice
for large, publicly held corporations.2 Because states have an interest in
generating the franchise fees that result from attracting incorporations,3
Delaware corporate law has been transformed into something akin to a
national law of corporations as other states follow its lead.4 Although critics
* Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. B.A. 1982, Fordham; J.D. 1985,
Harvard. The author wishes to thank Professors Robert W. Hamilton, Robert B. Thompson, and
Douglas K. Moll for their comments on a draft of this Article. He also wishes to thank Colin Marks
and Lee Thompson for their research assistance.
1. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1481
(1989) (noting that “Delaware is usually taken as the apotheosis of enabling statutes”); Larry E.
Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 123 n.192 (1991)
(noting that “Delaware has fashioned what is predominantly an enabling statute that accommodates
rather than restricts private ordering”). The other major philosophy of corporate law is the regulatory
approach, which creates mandatory rules of corporate behavior and seeks to maximize shareholder
protection. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1101 (1997) (contrasting the Delaware enabling model with a regulatory
approach that, at its extreme, prohibits anything not expressly permitted by the corporation statute). As
noted by its reporter, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, promulgated in 1984, was
designed to strike a balance between the enabling and regulatory approaches. See Robert W. Hamilton,
Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1466-68 (1986).
2. Recent studies show that more than half the companies in the Fortune 500 and more than
40% of the companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange were incorporated in Delaware. See
LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 6 (4th ed. 1998). Further, 82% of
public firms that chose to reincorporate between 1960 and 1982 did so in Delaware. See Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 244-
45 (1985).
3. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6-8 (1993) (noting
that Delaware collected over $200 million in franchise taxes in 1990, which accounted for 17.7% of
the state’s tax revenues). For an essay detailing New Jersey’s early lead in the competition to attract
franchise fees and the events that led to Delaware’s ultimate victory, see Andrew G.T. Moore II, A
Brief History of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware and the Amendatory Process,
in 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS H-1 (3d ed. 1999).
4. One commentator has argued that other states have followed Delaware’s statutory lead to the
point that there is little significant difference in statutory approaches among the states. See Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
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may dispute whether the states are racing to the bottom5 or the top6 in
copying Delaware corporate law, there can be no dispute that Delaware is
winning the race.
There is, however, one area in which Delaware corporate law is starkly at
odds with the rest of the nation. This area, now almost a quarter-century old,
involves the special rights and obligations of shareholders in closely held
corporations. In the landmark case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,7 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court defined a closely held corporation as
having: “(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the
corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the
management, direction and operations of the corporation.”8 Donahue
recognized that shareholders in closely held corporations have a different set
of expectations and vulnerabilities than do shareholders in publicly held
corporations. Shareholders in small corporations often expect to run their
businesses in the manner of a partnership rather than in the more formal
251, 255 (1977). Delaware’s common law has received similar respect among the several states. See,
e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990) (describing Delaware as
“the Mother Court of corporate law”), rev’d on other grounds, 500 U.S. 90 (1991); Dynamics Corp. of
Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that “Indiana takes its cues in matters of
corporation law from the Delaware courts”), rev’d on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); see also
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1969 (1991)
(arguing that “the Delaware Supreme Court remains the national supreme court on corporate law”).
5. Proponents of the race-to-the-bottom theory argue that, in the absence of federal regulation,
states have no choice but to compete with Delaware in relaxing corporate regulations to make their
jurisdictions more attractive to managers who make incorporation decisions. See William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974); see also
Lucien A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1509-10 (1992) (concluding that state competition is
undesirable where the interests of managers and controlling shareholders diverge from the interests of
public shareholders or the public at large). Although Professors Cary and Bebchuk argue for federal
intervention to prevent the worst abuses of the state competition system, they do not propose the
complete displacement of state corporate law by federal law. Other commentators, however, have gone
further and argued for the federal chartering of corporations to protect the rights of shareholders and
the public. See RALPH NADER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR
FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976); Donald E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal
Chartering of Corporations, 31 BUS. LAW. 1125 (1976).
6. Law and economics scholars argue that market forces require managers to select the
jurisdiction of incorporation that maximizes share value by offering the most efficient corporate rules.
See Romano, supra note 2, at 265-73; Winter, supra note 4; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 222 (1991) (arguing that,
although the competition for incorporations may not make state law entirely efficient, “competition
creates a powerful tendency for states to enact laws that operate to the benefit of investors”).
Proponents of this race-to-the-top view argue that Delaware’s dominance in the corporate arena
demonstrates that its enabling approach to corporate regulation is the most efficient approach.
7. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). For a discussion of Donahue, see infra Part I.A.
8. Id. at 511. Much of this article refers to “majority” stockholders and “controlling”
stockholders. These terms are used interchangeably to designate that person or group with sufficient
power to make corporate decisions.
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manner of a public corporation.9 Minority shareholders in a closely held
corporation face constant danger that those in control will improperly deny
minority shareholders their fair share of the corporation’s income stream.10 In
light of the practical realities of closely held corporations, the Donahue court
held that stockholders in closely held corporations owe one another a
fiduciary duty of fair treatment.11 Although courts have differed in their
conceptions of what this duty entails, the overwhelming national view has
been to recognize the duty and define its contours on a case-by-case basis.12
The Delaware Supreme Court first considered the problem of closely held
corporations only recently. Given Delaware’s focus on large publicly held
corporations, this fact is hardly surprising. In 1993, in Nixon v. Blackwell,13
the Delaware Supreme Court considered “[w]hether there should be any
special, judicially-created rules to ‘protect’ minority shareholders of closely
held Delaware corporations.”14 The court emphatically declined to create any
such special rules.15 If Nixon is to be read literally, much of what the rest of
the country accepts as illegal conduct in the close corporation sphere has no
remedy in Delaware. Further, given Delaware’s status as a leader in the
creation of national corporate law, Nixon may signify the beginning of the
decline of special legal status for closely held corporations.
In light of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon, does
Delaware law provide a license for oppression of minority shareholders in
closely held corporations? This article explores the extent to which Delaware
common law may be expected to prevent such an outcome.
Part I of this article examines the national law on shareholder rights and
obligations in closely held corporations. It will focus on the types of majority
shareholder misconduct that have been thought sufficient to justify judicial
intervention in the close corporation context. Part II examines the limited
Delaware case law on closely held corporations. A close analysis of Nixon
reveals that, although the court’s refusal to create special rules for closely
held corporations is broadly stated, Nixon did not involve egregious
misconduct by a controlling shareholder. Indeed, the specific result in Nixon
might well have been reached in jurisdictions that do impose special
9. See id. at 512.
10. See id. at 513 (describing a variety of freezeout techniques available to majority shareholders
in closely held corporations).
11. Id. at 515 (quoting Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E. 2d 843 (1952)) (establishing standard of
“utmost good faith [and] loyalty”).
12. See infra Part I.
13. 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993). The Nixon case is discussed in Part II.B, infra.
14. Id. at 1379.
15. See id. at 1379-81.
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obligations on shareholders in closely held corporations. There is, therefore,
some reason to doubt that the Delaware courts will allow oppression by a
controlling party in a case where the problem is squarely presented.
Part III explores the extent to which the Delaware law applicable to
corporations generally, including publicly held corporations, provides
protection for minority shareholders in closely held corporations. In
particular, controlling shareholders in all corporations have a duty of entire
fairness when engaging in self-dealing transactions. Delaware, despite its
general enabling philosophy, has applied the entire fairness test rigorously to
protect the rights of minority shareholders. Part III argues that the Delaware
entire fairness test provides a rubric that may be used to deal with most, if not
all, of the special situations in which other states have provided remedies to
minority shareholders in closely held corporations. In Part IV, the article
concludes that, when confronted with appropriate cases, there is reason to
believe that Delaware law in the close corporation context will turn out to be
similar to that of the rest of the nation.
I. THE PREVAILING NATIONAL MODEL: PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
A. The Creation of Fiduciary Duties
In publicly held corporations, shareholders generally owe no duties to
each other.16 An exception to this rule involves the duties of controlling
shareholders engaged in self-dealing transactions, which are discussed in Part
III. In contrast, courts have ascribed special duties to shareholders in closely
held corporations in recognition of the special attributes of such
corporations.17
The traditional model of the publicly held corporation treats shareholders
as passive investors. It is the directors’ job to supervise management of the
corporation’s affairs.18 Shareholders who are also employees have no special
16. See infra note 191.
17. The classic works on the special attributes of and the legal rules relating to closely held
corporations are F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS (3d
ed. 1998) [hereinafter O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS] and F. HODGE O’NEAL &
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION].
18. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1998). In exercising their statutory duties, directors
have no obligation to conform to the wishes of shareholders. See, e.g., Alabama By-Prods. Corp. v.
Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 265 (Del. 1995) (noting that “directors, rather than shareholders, manage
the business and affairs of the corporation”). Of course, “if the stockholders are displeased with the
action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/5
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rights as employees relative to nonshareholder employees.19 If the
corporation is profitable, whether to declare dividends or reinvest the profits
is a classic exercise of the board’s business judgment.20 Shareholders who are
unhappy with the board of directors have two basic avenues of protest: they
can engage in a proxy fight to replace the current board, or they can sell their
stock.
An entirely different set of assumptions and practical realities applies to
the closely held corporation. Shareholders in closely held corporations often
expect to participate in the corporation’s management, and closely held
corporations usually distribute the bulk of their profits in the form of salaries
rather than dividends.21 Indeed, shareholders may well invest in a closely
held corporation for the purpose of providing themselves with jobs and
salaries.22
In closely held corporations, minority shareholders are particularly
vulnerable. The minority is constantly at risk that the majority will divert to
itself a disproportionate share of the corporation’s income stream.23
Moreover, in closely held corporations, the minority is at risk of a particular
kind of self-dealing whereby the majority seeks to appropriate all or a portion
of the minority’s investment. The majority may “freeze out” minority
shareholders by denying them employment and failing to pay dividends.24
the board out.” Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985). For an argument
that the traditional model of shareholder passivity is no longer entirely accurate even in publicly held
corporations, and that shareholder activism provides a check on managerial discretion in the takeover
defense context, see Robert A. Ragazzo, The Legitimacy of Takeover Defense in the ‘90s, 41 DEPAUL
L. REV. 689, 731-35 (1992).
19. See Nagy v. Riblet Prods. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1996) (arguing that applying a
“‘fiduciary’ duty to every baggage handler at United Airlines just because the employee owns a share
of stock would put employee-owned firms at such a competitive disadvantage that they would soon
collapse”).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 65-67.
21. See, e.g., 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 6.02, at 2
(noting that “[u]nderstandably, a person may be unwilling to embark his savings in a new enterprise
unless he is assured of a continuing voice in the management of the business” and that “the usual
practice in a close company is to distribute a high percentage of company earnings in the form of
salaries rather than as dividends”).
22. For example, in Ueltzhoffer v. Fox Fire Dev. Co., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 204 (Del. Ch. 1991),
aff’d, 618 A.2d 90 (Del. 1992), discussed infra in Part II.A, the court noted that the timing of the
formation of a closely held corporation was propitious because the subordinate shareholder was “out
of work” and the father of the controlling shareholder “had some interest in finding a project that his
daughter . . . could handle.” Id. at *3.
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Mass. 1976)
(finding that the discharge of a minority shareholder-employee by a close corporation that paid no
dividends was “a designed ‘freezeout’ for which no legitimate business purpose has been suggested”);
In re Judicial Dissolution of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1181 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that
the discharge of minority shareholders by a corporation that paid no dividends amounted to an illegal
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Because shares in closely held corporations lack a public market, the
minority has great difficulty selling its stock to realize capital appreciation or
even to receive a return-of-capital.25 Often the majority employs a freezeout
technique to coerce minority stockholders to sell their shares to the majority
at bargain prices.26
In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,27 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court took note of the distinguishing characteristics of closely held
corporations28 and held that “stockholders in the close corporation owe one
another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the
enterprise that partners owe to one another.”29 Although Donahue
denominated this newly created shareholder duty as “fiduciary” in nature,
this designation is a misnomer. A true fiduciary is required to act in a
nonselfish manner for the benefit of some other party. Classic examples are
trustees acting on behalf of beneficiaries and agents acting on behalf of
principals.30 However, controlling shareholders in closely held corporations,
like all other shareholders, have legitimate selfish interests. Thus, the
“fiduciary” duty recognized in Donahue is really a duty to act fairly toward
“squeeze-out”); see generally 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 17, ch. 3 (describing
a variety of freezeout techniques).
25. See generally 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 17, § 2.15. Closely held
corporations often have provisions restricting the transferability of shares. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 202(c) (1998) (permitting designated categories of transfer restrictions); § 342(a)(2) (making the
existence of a stock transfer restriction a prerequisite to the election of statutory close corporation
status). Although such provisions serve a legitimate purpose in allowing founding shareholders control
over the introduction of new investors, they exacerbate the problem of illiquidity in closely held
corporations.
Two commentators have argued that the best solution to the predicament of minority shareholders
is to allow them a permanent right to sell their shares to the corporation at fair value. See John
Hetherington & Michael Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the
Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977). But see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 6, at 238-43 (arguing that an absolute buyout right would place too great a burden on most
closely held corporations).
26. See infra Part I.B.5.
27. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
28. See id. at 511-15.
29. Id. at 515. For other cases holding that shareholders in a closely held corporation have the
same duties as partners, see Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Comolli v. Comolli,
246 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 1978); Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. Ct. App.
1978). Although the typical context involves the application of fiduciary duties to majority
shareholders, minority shareholders may also have such duties when they have the ability to exercise
power over corporate action. See Smith v. Atlantic Prop., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) (defining “agency” as “the fiduciary
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall
act on his behalf and subject to his control, and the consent by the other so to act”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959) (defining a “trust” as “a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held to equitable duties to deal with
the property for the benefit of another person”).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/5
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other shareholders.
Courts have struggled with the parameters of this duty of fairness.31 The
Donahue court took the position that whenever the majority receives a
benefit in the corporate context, the minority must receive equal access to the
same benefit.32 In Donahue, the court found a breach of fiduciary duty where
a majority shareholder was permitted to sell his shares back to the
corporation, albeit at a concededly fair price, because the minority did not
receive the same opportunity.33 The court placed special emphasis on the
value of liquidity in the close corporation context.34
Donahue’s equal opportunity rule has proved controversial.35 Indeed, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has abandoned the equal opportunity
principle. Fearful that Donahue would unduly hinder the majority’s ability to
run the enterprise, the Supreme Judicial Court later held that the majority
fulfills its fiduciary duty to the minority whenever it acts for a legitimate
business purpose unless the minority can demonstrate that this purpose could
be accomplished in an alternative manner less destructive of the minority’s
interests.36
The Massachusetts rule measures fairness from the majority’s
perspective. It asks whether the majority has pursued legitimate goals rather
than whether the majority’s conduct has had an unfair impact upon the
minority’s investment.37 Other states, led by New York, measure fairness
from the minority’s perspective. They hold that the majority breaches its
fiduciary duty to the minority whenever it engages in conduct that frustrates
31. As noted by a leading commentator, however, “[d]ifferences as to the scope and meaning of
the fiduciary duties under a Donahue standard do not detract from its widespread acceptance.” Robert
B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 729 (1993).
32. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19.
33. See id. at 519-20.
34. See id. at 514-15, 518.
35. Delaware squarely rejected the equal opportunity rule in Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366
(Del. 1993); see infra Part II.B; see also Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642 (Md. 1985);
Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Delahoussaye v. Newhard,
785 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 247 (arguing that
“courts have found the equal opportunity rule . . . impossible to administer”). The equal opportunity
rule was adopted in the pre-Donahue case of Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969)
(holding that majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty by creating a market for their stock
that was not made available to the minority) and has not been retracted by the California Supreme
Court. See also James D. Cox, Equal Treatment for Shareholders: An Essay, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 615
(1997) (defending the equal treatment regime).
36. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
37. For cases following the Massachusetts approach, see Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins,
Inc., 804 P.2d 359 (Mont. 1990); Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc.,
560 P.2d 1086 (Or. 1977).
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the reasonable investment expectations of the minority.38 According to this
view, the legitimacy of the majority’s purposes is irrelevant if the minority is
denied something for which it bargained, either explicitly or implicitly, at the
time of investment.39
In hard cases, the distinction between the Massachusetts and New York
conceptions of the majority’s fiduciary duty in the close corporation context
might well be relevant. However, most litigated cases have been easy cases.
Thus, there has been little cause to choose between the competing
approaches.40 The typical freezeout scheme is illegal, whatever the standard
38. See In re Judicial Dissolution of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984); see
also McCallum v. Rosen’s Diversified, Inc., 153 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying Minnesota law);
Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985); Machmeier v. Southside Press, Ltd., 435 N.W.2d
377 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988); Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1993); McCauley v. Tom
McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551
(N.C. 1983); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987); Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980). For a thoughtful
analysis of the perspective from which fiduciary duties should be measured in closely held
corporations, see Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered
Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
39. Where no explicit contract exists, the concept of an implicit bargain is at the heart of the
minority-centered view. The requirement that the minority’s expectation at the time of investing must
be “reasonable” requires a finding based on an objective standard that the majority was aware, or
should have been aware, of the minority’s special interests (e.g., in corporate employment). One court
explained:
Majority conduct should not be deemed oppressive simply because the petitioner’s subjective
hopes and desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled. . . . Rather, oppression should be deemed
to arise only when the majority conduct substantially defeats expectations that, objectively
viewed, were both reasonable under the circumstances and were central to the [minority]’s
decision to join the venture.
In re Judicial Dissolution of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984); see also
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983) (holding that “[i]n order for plaintiff’s
expectations to be reasonable, they must be known to or assumed by the other shareholders and
concurred in by them”).
Moreover, quasi-contractual language also appears in cases purportedly taking a majority-centered
view. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662-63 (Mass. 1976)
(noting that “by terminating a minority shareholder’s employment or by severing him from a position
as an officer or director, the majority effectively frustrate the minority stockholder’s purposes in
entering on the corporate venture”). Although the reasonableness of a minority shareholder’s
expectations is usually measured as of the time of investment, one recent case holds that such
expectations may evolve over time in a way that is entitled to judicial respect. See A.W. Chesterton
Co. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Mersilman v. Mersilman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C.
1983); 2 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 17, § 7.15, at 91 (arguing that “[t]he relevant
expectations are those that exist at the inception of the enterprise, and as they develop thereafter
through a course of dealing concurred in by all shareholders”). For an argument that courts should
respect shareholder agreements to limit fiduciary duties in close corporations, see Dale A. Oesterle,
Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State Courts to Restructure the Internal
Affairs of Small Businesses, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 888-92 (1995).
40. See, e.g., Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate
Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 322 (1990) (noting that “[a]lthough courts focusing on the
majority’s duty of utmost good faith and loyalty and courts focusing on the minority’s reasonable
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/5
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of judicial review, in any jurisdiction that accepts the basic principal that the
majority owes a fiduciary duty to the minority in a closely held corporation.
There is a well recognized core of minority interests that the majority may
not transgress regardless of the standard of judicial review. These interests
generally fall into five categories, which are discussed below.
B. The Scope of Fiduciary Duties
1. The Interest in Employment
Employees in publicly held corporations often own stock in their
employers.41 It is increasingly common for public corporations to pay part of
the employee’s compensation in stock, stock options,42 or other forms that
mirror the more traditional forms of equity ownership.43 From the
corporation’s standpoint, forms of compensation that tie the employee’s self-
interest to that of the larger stockholder body are beneficial because they
reduce the agency costs of running the enterprise.44
From the standpoint of an employee in a publicly held corporation,
however, the economic interest in stock ownership and the economic interest
in employment are largely separate. As a stockholder, the employee’s interest
is the same as all other stockholders. The employee-stockholder seeks an
expected return on his investment that adequately compensates for the risk of
expectations do take different approaches, in practice, there is little difference”).
41. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 42
(8th ed. 1998) (noting that pension funds own 17.4% of all equity securities); John Hoerr, “We’re Not
Going to Sit Around and Allow Management to Louse Things Up”, BUS. WK., May 18, 1987, at 107
(noting that “employees own at least 20% of nearly 30 publicly traded companies with more than
1,000 workers”).
42. A stock option is an agreement by which the employee is granted an option to purchase a
specified number of shares for a limited time, usually several years, at a fixed price. If the market price
of the stock rises, the option may be profitably exercised.
43. Such forms include: stock appreciation rights (such rights allow the option holder to
surrender the option to the corporation and receive, either in stock or cash, the difference between the
current market value of the optioned stock and the option price); restricted stock plans (which involve
the issuance of shares to an employee, typically as a bonus or at a bargain price, subject to substantial
restrictions on transfer, such as the inability to sell for a specified period, that affect its value); and
phantom stock plans (which credit the executive with “units” on the books of the corporation that are
redeemable on death or retirement, with one “unit” being equal to the market value of one share of the
corporation’s stock when the “unit” is created, and with each unit being increased by the amount of
dividends paid on a share of stock and by future increases in the market value of a share). See
Subcommittee on Executive Compensation, ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law,
Executive Compensation: A 1987 Road Map for the Corporate Advisor, 43 BUS. LAW. 185 (1987).
44. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (arguing that most
conflicts between shareholders and managers can be minimized through incentive compensation
schemes).
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investing in the enterprise.45 According to modern portfolio theory,
company- and industry-specific risk can be eliminated by investing in a
diverse portfolio of stocks.46 Modern economic theory predicts, therefore,
that the market provides no compensation for taking diversifiable risk.47 As a
consequence, a rational employee-shareholder should not invest too large a
portion of his savings in his employer.
Such an employee’s interest in his job, by contrast, is some function of
the personal satisfaction that the job brings and the level of monetary
compensation and other benefits that the job provides. If the employee is
satisfied with his job, but comes to believe that the stock in his employer is a
bad investment, the employee can simply sell the stock. If the employee
desires to change jobs or is fired, but continues to believe that the stock is a
good investment, the employee may continue to hold stock in his former
employer. The act of changing jobs does nothing to alter the risk-return
calculation that makes the stock in the employer either a good or a bad
investment. Moreover, even if the employee believes that investment in the
employer is worthwhile only as long as employment continues, the employee
is at liberty to sell the employer’s stock for noneconomic reasons at the time
his job terminates.
Because these employee and stockholder interests are largely separate in a
publicly held corporation, it is entirely proper that the general corporate rule
provides the employee-stockholder with no special protection against
discharge.48 Indeed, an agreement between director-shareholders in a
publicly held corporation permanently to maintain one of their number in an
employment position is void as an illegal restraint on the board’s authority to
45. The Capital Asset Pricing Model is the most accepted explanation of the relationship between
risk and return. The model postulates that the expected return of an investment portfolio (ERp) is equal
to the risk-free rate of return (Rf) plus the beta (which is a measure of the systematic or market-based
risk of the portfolio and excludes company- and industry-specific risk) of the portfolio (Bp) multiplied
by the difference between the expected rate of return on the market portfolio (ERm) and the risk-free
rate of return. In symbols, ERp = Rf + Bp(ERm - Rf). See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 110 (2d ed. 1995).
The model makes two significant predictions: first, a portfolio’s expected return will vary linearly
with the beta of the portfolio, and second, since the other factors in the model represent observable
constants, a portfolio’s expected return will vary only in accordance with its beta. Studies have tended
to verify the first but not the second of these predictions. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761,
782 (1985). For a significant challenge to the CAPM model, see Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, The
Cross Section of Expected Stock Returns, 47 J. FIN. 427 (1992) (arguing that long-term returns
correlate more closely with company size and price-to-book ratios than with the beta of the
investment).
46. See, e.g., GILSON & BLACK, supra note 45, at 81-100.
47. This is the import of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. See note 45, supra.
48. See Nagy v. Riblet Prod. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1996); see also supra note 19.
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manage the corporation.49 The directors owe a duty to the public
shareholders who are not parties to the agreement to use their best judgment
on a continuing basis in choosing the corporation’s employees.
The rules and expectations change, however, in the close corporation
context. Closely held corporations have a small enough number of
shareholders so that all shareholders are normally parties to whatever explicit
or implicit understandings are reached at the corporation’s inception.50 In a
closely held corporation, a shareholder-employee has interests in his job and
stock that are often economically intertwined.51 Holding stock in a closely
held corporation, viewed purely as an investment decision, seems almost
irrational from an economic perspective. Small businesses are exceedingly
risky enterprises with high failure rates.52 To compensate fairly for this level
of risk, the expected return would also have to be disproportionately large.
Moreover, many investors in small businesses invest a significant portion of
their life savings in the business.53 This practice defeats their ability to
diversify their investment portfolios and exposes them to company- and
industry-specific risk. As a result, investors in closely held corporations
would seem well advised to trust their capital to diversified mutual funds
rather than a small corporation.
If investors in closely held corporations are economically rational, it can
only be because such investments have compensating benefits not available
to investors in publicly held corporations.54 In many cases, a shareholder in a
closely held corporation expects to receive such compensating benefits
through employment. The shareholder may invest for the purpose of having a
job that produces higher compensation than could be garnered through
employment by third parties. Even if the employee-shareholder’s
compensation is no higher than his next best alternative, an investment in a
49. See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934).
50. Where all shareholders are a party to an explicit agreement and there is no injury to creditors,
the cases generally uphold the ability of shareholders to contract to maintain one of their number in an
employment position. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964); Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E.
641 (N.Y. 1936). In this context, there is no reason that courts should not enforce implicit agreements
between shareholders as well as explicit ones.
51. See generally 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 6.02.
52. See U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, THE ANNUAL REPORT ON SMALL BUSINESS
AND COMPETITION 26 (1996) (noting that 60% of all small businesses fail within one year).
53. See 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 17, § 3.06, at 37 (noting that “[a]
person acquiring a substantial interest in a close corporation often invests a large percentage of his
personal resources to acquire that interest”).
54. As Easterbrook and Fischel argue, closely held corporations experience lower agency costs
than their public brethren because their is no separation of ownership from control. See EASTERBROOK
& FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 229-30. It seems doubtful, however, that this reduction alone compensates
for the enormous extra risk of investing in closely held corporations.
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closely held corporation may still be justified because the ability to keep his
job may be more stable and certain. Additionally, the employee may simply
derive satisfaction from working in a business that he himself takes a
substantial part in managing.55
The close relationship between investment and employment in the closely
held corporation is also demonstrated by a common method through which
such corporations distribute their profits. Theoretically, employees should
receive no more than a reasonable salary in return for their work. Any extra
profit should be distributed to the shareholders by way of dividends.
However, closely held corporations often distribute de facto dividends to
their employee-shareholders in the form of enhanced salary and benefits.56
As long as all shareholders receive their fair share of the corporation’s
income stream, the co-venturers are usually indifferent to the method by
which profits are distributed.57 Indeed, close corporations often prefer to
distribute as much of their profits as they can in the form of salary because,
unlike dividend payments, salary payments provide a tax deduction to the
corporation.58
Thus, a shareholder in a closely held corporation often has a significant
investment interest in his job. He often invests for the purpose of having a
job, and the salary and other benefits he receives are conceived to be part of
the return on his investment. In these circumstances, the discharge of an
employee in a closely held corporation usually involves appropriation of a
portion of his investment by the remaining shareholders.59 This action is
55. For an argument that employment in a closely held corporation has an investment value
based on its superiority over alternative employment opportunities, see Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder
Oppression v. Employment At Will in the Closely Held Corporation: The Investment Model Solution,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 517, 547-50.
56. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 660, 662 n.13 (Mass.
1976) (noting that the corporation never paid any dividends but increased salaries over time as it
became more profitable); In re Judicial Dissolution of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180
(N.Y. 1984) (finding that the corporation had “a long-standing policy of awarding ‘de facto’ dividends
in the form of ‘extra compensation bonuses’“).
57. See, e.g., Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936) (upholding an agreement to maintain a
25% shareholder in an executive position and pay that shareholder 25% of the corporation’s profits in
either salary or dividends).
58. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(a)(1) (1994). The Internal Revenue Service may disallow corporate
deductions for unreasonably large salary payments on the theory that some portion of the salary
payments involves de facto dividends. Salary payments are reasonable if in “such amount as would
ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances . . . existing at the date
when the contract for services was made.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.162–7(b)(3) (1999). For one among many
cases applying this rule, see Patton v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 166, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1986). Of course,
given the self-assessment nature of the tax system, there is a large incentive to distribute corporate
profits in the form of salaries and hope the matter never comes to the attention of the Internal Revenue
Service.
59. See Nagy v. Riblet Prods. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that in a closely
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especially injurious where the corporation pays de facto dividends in the
form of enhanced salaries and benefits.60 However, it is a problem even in
situations where the majority pays itself no more than a reasonable salary
after the minority’s discharge. After discharge, the minority is relegated to
the corporation’s expected returns to justify the risk of its investment capital.
As discussed above, these returns are unlikely to be satisfactory on their own.
Because their investment and employment expectations are
interdependent, shareholders in closely held corporations receive protections
against employment discharge that shareholders in publicly held corporations
do not. The discharge of a minority shareholder is one of the common
grounds relied upon by courts in finding a breach of the majority’s fiduciary
duty in the close corporation context.61
2. The Interest in Dividends
A shareholder in a profitable, publicly held corporation derives an
held corporation that distributes its profits in salaries, “firing an employee is little different from
canceling his shares”).
60. See In re Judicial Dissolution of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180-81 (N.Y.
1984) (finding oppression of the minority based in part on the majority’s decision to pay itself de facto
dividends in the form of salary bonuses after minority shareholders were discharged).
61. See, e.g., McCallum v. Rosen’s Diversified, Inc., 153 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying
Minnesota law); Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); W & W Equipment
Co. v. Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353
N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); In re Judicial Dissolution of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y.
1984); In re Application of Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411
N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987); Duncan v. Lichtenberger, 671 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
Courts have found, however, that lack of access to employment by the minority did not result in a
breach of the majority’s fiduciary duty where the expectation of employment had no reasonable basis,
see, e.g., Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1993) (finding that a minority shareholder who
received stock as a gift from her father and never worked for the company had no reasonable
expectation that her son and daughter-in-law would receive employment), or a discharge was not part
of any freezeout scheme, see, e.g., Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351 (Mass. 1996) (finding no
relationship between the employee’s stock and his job and noting that the employee was able to sell his
stock back to the corporation at a fair price). Two New York cases hold that the majority may
discharge the minority for the purpose of taking advantage of a contractual requirement that the
employee offer the stock back to the corporation without breaching any fiduciary duty. Gallagher v.
Lambert, 549 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1989); Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, 535 N.E.2d 1311 (N.Y. 1989).
But see Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987). Gallagher and Ingle are difficult
to square with other New York cases taking a strongly supportive view of the employment rights of
minority shareholders in closely held corporations, such as In re Judicial Dissolution of Kemp &
Beatley, supra. Gallagher is especially questionable because the contractual sale price for the
employee’s shares in that case was less than fair value. Perhaps Gallagher and Ingle are
distinguishable because they involved employee-shareholders who started as employees and then
became shareholders, rather than shareholders who invested on the understanding that they would be
employees. As a consequence, the New York Court of Appeals may have been comfortable treating
Gallagher and Ingle as employee termination cases rather than shareholder rights cases.
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economic benefit whether profits are distributed through dividends or
reinvested in the corporation. For example, if profits are $2.00 per share, the
shareholder will either receive $2.00 in dividends or see the trading value of
his stock increase by approximately $2.00.62 To be sure, a public shareholder
is not indifferent as to whether profits are paid out or reinvested. The board
of directors should reinvest profits only when the new projects promise
expected returns at a level equal to or in excess of the corporation’s cost of
capital.63 Otherwise, shareholders are unfairly compensated for the risk of the
investments and are better off receiving dividends and choosing their own
investment vehicles.64 The choice between paying dividends and reinvesting
62. Two leading economists have argued that dividend policy would be irrelevant in a world
without transaction costs. See Merton Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth and the
Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411 (1961). In a world where dividend payments result in immediate
taxation to the shareholder, this theory would suggest that shareholders prefer minimal or no
dividends. Nevertheless, shareholders often react positively to the payment of dividends because such
payments often signal positive management expectations regarding the future. See Fischer Black, The
Dividend Puzzle, 2 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 5-8 (1976). Moreover, managers may reinvest income to
further their selfish goals rather than to make investments that are efficient from a corporate
perspective. See infra note 64. As a consequence, a decision to withhold all dividends based on per
share profits of $2.00 may result in a market price increase of less than $2.00.
63. The two most important capital budgeting methods are the net present value method and the
internal rate of return method. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 45, at 66-73, 76-78. To apply the net
present value method, one determines the expected returns of a potential investment and discounts
those returns to present value using a discount rate that appropriately measures the corporation’s level
of risk. As a result, expected returns in riskier corporations have lower present values than expected
returns in less risky corporations. Investments are justified when the present value of the investment
exceeds the present cost of the investment.
In contrast, the internal rate of return method asks at what discount rate the net present value of
the expected returns of an investment is zero. Only if the internal rate of return generated by the
project is higher than the rate of return normally required for corporate investments (which should
equal or exceed the corporation’s actual discount rate) should the project be undertaken. These capital
budgeting methods are similar, and both reflect the concept that an investment that is likely to produce
positive future returns can still be unwise unless those returns are sufficient to justify the risk of the
investment.
64. According to Professor Jensen’s free cash flow theory, managers often make investments for
which returns are inadequate to compensate for the risks. See Michael Jensen, The Takeover
Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE
TAKEOVER 314, 319-21 (Coffee et al. eds., 1988) (arguing that cash-rich companies make excellent
takeover targets). Such investments increase the size of the corporation and the power, prestige, and
perquisites of its managers. They also diversify the corporation’s business and help reduce the
corporation’s level of risk, which in turn reduces the risk of bankruptcy and helps to safeguard the
positions and substantial salaries of the corporation’s key executives. Diversification in publicly held
investments, however, is better accomplished at the shareholder level than at the firm level. See
GILSON & BLACK, supra note 45, at 336-62.
Shareholders would prefer to receive dividends rather than have the corporation make investments
with a negative net present value or an internal rate of return that is less than the corporation’s discount
rate. From the perspective of diversified shareholders, the increased returns from profitable
investments should more than compensate for potential losses from bankruptcy. Managers, however,
are unable to diversify their employment capital in the same manner. Therefore, they have a selfish
interest in increasing the size and safety of the corporation, even if this conflicts with the priorities of
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profits has much more stark economic effects in the close corporation
context.
Whether to pay dividends or reinvest profits in a publicly held corporation
is a classic example of a directors’ decision protected by the business
judgment rule.65 Because the business judgment rule requires scant
justification to insulate director conduct from judicial scrutiny, it is
tantamount to a rule of directors’ carte blanche.66 This freedom from judicial
supervision is thought to be justified by: (a) the board’s statutory duty to
supervise management of the corporation’s affairs; (b) the need to encourage
risk-taking among directors without fear of second-guessing if business
decisions turn out badly; and (c) the judiciary’s relative lack of business
expertise.67
In closely held corporations, the payment of dividends is ordinarily of
little consequence when all shareholders receive salaries. When the majority
shareholder receives a salary, however, and the minority does not— either
because a job for the minority was not part of the basic investment deal
between the parties or because the majority has fired the minority— this
situation changes drastically. A minority shareholder who receives neither
salary nor dividends receives no present return on his investment.68 Unlike a
public shareholder, the minority shareholder has no public market in which
he can sell his stock to realize capital appreciation.
The wrongful suppression of dividends is a common ground on which
courts find that majority shareholders have breached their fiduciary duties in
closely held corporations.69 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s
diversified shareholders. For an argument that managers often pursue a less risky course than
diversified shareholders would prefer, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The
Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1986).
65. See, e.g., Gabelli & Co., Inc. v. Liggett Group Inc., 479 A.2d 276, 280 (Del. 1984).
66. In cases to which the business judgment rule applies, the board’s decision is upheld whenever
its conduct “can be attributed to any rational business purpose.” Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717, 720 (Del. 1971).
67. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979); Ronald J. Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 819, 822-23 (1981).
68. See 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 17, § 3.04, at 13 (noting that a
nonemployed shareholder is “deprived of any return on his investment during the years that dividends
are withheld”).
69. See, e.g., Crowley v. Communications for Hospitals, Inc., 573 N.E.2d 996 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991); Miller v. Magline, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 761 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645
P.2d 929 (Mont. 1982); In re Judicial Dissolution of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y.
1984); Hirschkorn v. Severson, 319 N.W.2d 475 (N.D. 1982); Patton v. Nicholas, 279 S.W.2d 848
(Tex. 1955); Duncan v. Lichtenberger, 671 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. App. 1984).
Conversely, when the majority pays substantial dividends, see Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d
1019 (N.J. 1993) (finding certain majority actions illegal but refusing to require dissolution where
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1153+Engel.doc 03/22/00   9:27 AM
1114 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:1099
decision in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.70 represents a classic
example of a freezeout scheme that combined discharge with suppression of
dividends. In Wilkes, four equal investors created a corporation for the
purpose of running a nursing home. At the time of the corporation’s creation,
it was understood that each investor would be a director and an officer and
would receive an equal distribution of the corporation’s profits.71 Initially, the
corporation made no payments to any of its shareholder-employees. After
about one year of operation, the corporation began to pay each employee
thirty-five dollars per week in salary. Eventually, this amount was increased
to one hundred dollars per week.72 The corporation never paid any
dividends.73 Sixteen years after the corporation’s formation, one of the
shareholders, Wilkes, had a falling out with the other three. Wilkes was
removed from the board of directors and discharged from his employment.
The court noted that “by terminating a minority stockholder’s employment or
by severing him from a position as an officer or director, the majority
effectively frustrate the minority stockholder’s purposes in entering on the
corporate venture and also deny him an equal return on his investment.”74
Accordingly, the court held that the three controlling shareholders had
violated their fiduciary duty to Wilkes.75
3. The Interest in Participation
Shareholders in publicly held corporations have whatever participatory
rights are allowed by the relevant state’s corporation statute, plus whatever
supplementary rights are granted by the corporate charter and bylaws.
Typically, the public shareholder plays a passive role in corporate affairs. He
has no right to be a director absent an enforceable shareholder agreement to
this effect.76 He can access the corporation’s books and records if he has a
minority shareholder received dividends or de facto dividends ranging from $17,500 to $26,000 per
year), or has persuasive business reasons for not paying dividends, see 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON,
OPPRESSION, supra note 17, § 3.05, at 21-22 (noting that “[w]henever the corporation needs large
amounts of working or expansion capital and majority abuses are not present, retention of funds is
sustained”), no breach of fiduciary duty will be found.
70. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
71. See id. at 659-60.
72. See id. at 660.
73. See id. at 662 n.13.
74. Id. at 662-63.
75. See id. at 664.
76. See, e.g., Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441
(Del. 1947); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(c) (1998) (enforcing written shareholder voting
agreements).
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proper purpose.77 Otherwise, the public shareholder has little or no say in the
day-to-day management of the corporation.
By contrast, shareholders in closely held corporations often expect to be
intimately involved in the corporation’s affairs. Such shareholders often
expect to be directors and senior executives and would not invest otherwise.
Voting a minority shareholder off the board of directors78 and denying the
minority access to corporate information79 have contributed to findings of
breach of fiduciary duty in the close corporation context.
Although denying the minority participation rights alone may frustrate the
minority’s reasonable expectations, the majority often employs a
participatory freezeout as a complement to a financial freezeout.80 Removing
minority shareholders from the board and denying or restricting their access
to corporate records makes it more difficult for the minority to determine
whether the corporation could pay reasonable dividends, the majority is
receiving excessive compensation or other benefits, or the majority is
otherwise engaged in illegal self-dealing. Denying access to financial records
also makes it difficult for the minority to value its stock accurately in the
event the majority makes a purchase offer.
4. Protection Against Self-dealing
In any corporation with a majority shareholder, the minority is at risk that
the majority shareholder will engage in self-dealing and appropriate to itself a
disproportionate share of the corporation’s income stream.81 Although self-
77. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1998).
78. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); Brenner v.
Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1993); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987).
79. See, e.g., McCallum v. Rosen’s Diversified, Inc., 153 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying
Minnesota law and granting minority shareholder’s petition for a buyout that alleged, inter alia, that
the plaintiff had been excluded from decision-making and denied access to the corporation’s books
and records); Duncan v. Lichtenberger, 671 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. App. 1984) (finding breach of the
majority’s fiduciary duty and noting that majority prevented discharged minority shareholders from
returning to the corporation’s premises).
80. See 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 17, § 3.06, at 38 (noting that “removal
of a minority shareholder from the board reduces his access to information on what is going on in the
corporation and thereby his ability to protect himself against squeeze plays”). For the various
techniques that the majority may use in addition to removing the minority from the board, see id., §
3.11.
81. Of course, this danger is present in publicly held as well as closely held corporations. See
Paramount Comm. Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42-43 (Del. 1993) (noting the
vulnerability of shareholders in a publicly held corporation when a controlling stake in a corporation is
sold); see also Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1137 (D. Or. 1984) (noting that
acquisition of a 51% interest would “subject remaining stockholders to a captive status”); Lucien A.
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1693, 1710-13 (1985) (arguing that the creation of a new majority shareholder in a public
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dealing by a controlling shareholder is a problem that transcends the type of
corporation involved, self-dealing has some special implications in the
context of the closely held corporation. Initially, self-dealing is a more
common problem in the closely held corporation. Most publicly held
corporations do not have a majority or controlling shareholder.82 By contrast,
closely held corporations often have a majority shareholder. Even when no
majority shareholder exists, the number of shareholders is small enough that
the formation of a controlling group is easy. As a consequence, oppression of
minority shareholders is an omnipresent problem in closely held
corporations.
In addition, the majority in a closely held corporation often employs self-
dealing as a complement to a financial and participatory freezeout of the
minority. Common self-dealing tactics in this context include: paying
unreasonably high salaries to the majority; granting leases and loans to the
majority on favorable terms; entering into other contracts between the
corporation and the majority that are unfavorable to the corporation; having
the corporation purchase shares from the majority at more than their fair
value; allowing the majority to appropriate corporate assets for personal use;
and allowing the majority to usurp corporate opportunities.83
Moreover, self-dealing in closely held corporations is less constrained
than in publicly held corporations. In publicly held corporations, the capital,
product, and employment markets constrain opportunistic behavior.84 These
market mechanisms do not operate as effectively in closely held corporations
because such corporations do not participate in the capital markets and the
misbehavior of controlling shareholders is therefore less likely to become
public. Self-dealing in a closely held corporation usually involves the
majority’s appropriation of a portion of the minority’s investment with few
countervailing costs to the majority.
For the foregoing reasons, courts often rely on illegal self-dealing by the
majority to find breaches of fiduciary duty in the close corporation context.85
corporation with the power to engage in self-dealing diminishes the value of minority shares).
82. See Robert J. Larner, Ownership and Control in the 200 Largest Nonfinancial Corporations,
1929 and 1963, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 780-85 (1966) (concluding that, in 169 of the 200 largest
nonfinancial public corporations, no single shareholder owned as much as a 10% stake).
83. On the variety of self-dealing tactics employed by the majority, see 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON,
OPPRESSION, supra note 17, at §§ 3.07, 3.12-3.20.
84. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 67, at 833-34. Another check on opportunistic behavior in public
corporations is the market for corporate control. Of course, this market is inoperative in public
corporations with a controlling shareholder.
85. See, e.g., McCallum v. Rosen’s Diversified, Inc., 153 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying
Minnesota law and granting minority shareholder’s petition for a buyout that alleged, inter alia, that
the majority had usurped corporate opportunities and commingled personal ventures with the
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5. Protection Against Forced Sales
When the majority has engaged in some or all of the forms of misconduct
described above, it often administers the coup de grace by offering to
purchase the minority’s stock at a fraction of its true worth. Such an offer has
often been part of a freezeout scheme invalidated by the courts.86 Were the
courts to offer minorities no protection against forced sales, an oppressed
minority might well have no choice but to accept the majority’s low price
because there is no other market for the stock and no other way for the
minority to receive any value if it is subject to a freezeout.
C. Remedies
The traditional remedy for breach of fiduciary duty in closely held
corporations was to provide compensation to the minority for past economic
injuries combined with injunctive relief to help guarantee fairness in the
future. For example, the remedy for an illegal discharge of a minority
shareholder might be reinstatement or lost wages.87 The remedy for
suppressing dividends might be an injunction requiring the corporation to
pay reasonable dividends in the future.88 The remedy for violation of the
shareholder’s participatory rights might involve reinstatement as a director or
the provision of expanded access to the corporation’s financial information.89
corporation’s affairs); In re Judicial Dissolution of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y.
1984) (finding oppression of minority shareholders based in part on the fact that majority shareholders
paid themselves de facto dividends in the form of extra compensation bonuses); Davis v. Sheerin, 754
S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1988) (affirming a jury finding of shareholder oppression that relied in part on
the majority’s contribution of corporate funds to a pension plan in which only the majority had an
interest and on the majority’s use of corporate funds to pay attorneys’ fees in litigation against the
minority); cf. Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1993) (declining to find that majority
shareholder’s salary, which had reached $476,206, was unreasonable but noting that any future
compensation increases might be viewed unfavorably by the court).
86. See, e.g., McCallum v. Rosen’s Diversified, Inc., 153 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying
Minnesota law and granting minority shareholder’s petition for a buyout alleging that the majority had
offered to redeem his shares at an artificially low price); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353
N.E.2d 657, 664 n.14 (Mass. 1976) (noting that the majority offered to purchase the minority’s stock
for a price that a member of the majority group would not accept for his own shares); Patton v.
Nicholas, 279 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Tex. 1955) (noting majority shareholder’s suggestion that “he would
not buy the stock of [the minority] for even a small fraction of its value”). In contrast, courts have
found no breach of fiduciary duty by the majority where the majority has offered to purchase the
minority’s interest at a fair price. See Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351 (Mass. 1996); Ingle v.
Glamore Motor Sales, 535 N.E.2d 1311 (N.Y. 1989).
87. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976) (awarding
a discharged minority shareholder the salary he would have received had he continued as an officer
and director of the corporation).
88. See, e.g., Patton v. Nicholas, 279 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. 1955).
89. See, e.g., Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1033 (N.J. 1993) (reinstating a minority
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The remedy for illegal self-dealing might be compensation to the minority
for the pro rata diminution in the value of the minority’s stock plus an
injunction forbidding such conduct in the future.90
There are three difficulties with such purely compensatory forms of relief:
(a) they involve the court in continued supervision of an acrimonious
relationship; (b) by the time such shareholder disputes get to court, the
relationship between the parties has usually deteriorated to such an extent
that it is impractical to expect the parties to continue in business together; and
(c) after substantial illegal conduct has been proved, it is unfair to a minority
shareholder to require him to continue to trust the majority to treat him and
his investment in a fair manner.
As a consequence of these difficulties, thirty-seven states have passed
statutes that permit a court to dissolve a closely held corporation upon a
finding that the majority has “oppressed” the minority.91 Dissolution allows
the minority to receive a return on its capital representing the minority’s pro
rata share of the enterprise. Exactly what distinguishes oppression from a
breach of fiduciary duty is hardly clear, although it seems that a substantial
and continuing breach of fiduciary duty will constitute oppression.92
Although it was once thought detrimental to society to dissolve profitable
corporations,93 it is now recognized that the resources of such corporations
will not be removed from public intercourse. If a corporation is truly
profitable, a third party or one of the existing shareholders will probably
purchase it at the dissolution sale and continue to operate the business.94
In recent years, courts have developed an alternative to dissolution in
cases where compensatory and injunctive relief are deemed inadequate. In
these cases, the court may order the corporation or the majority to purchase
the minority’s stock at a fair value determined by the court in lieu of the
shareholder as a director).
90. See, e.g., Williams v. Shatz Mfg. Co., 449 F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (requiring a return
of excess compensation to the corporation); Hirsch v. Cahn Elec. Co., 694 So. 2d 636 (La. Ct. App.
1997) (requiring corporation to pay a dividend with a large portion of bonuses returned to the
corporation); cf. Chambers v. Beaver-Advance Corp., 140 A.2d 808 (Pa. 1958) (noting that injunctive
relief is available to prevent majority from siphoning off funds through unreasonable bonuses).
91. See Thompson, supra note 31, at 709 n.70 (collecting statutes). Of course, because
dissolution is an equitable remedy, a court is always permitted to grant relief short of dissolution after
finding the existence of oppressive conduct. See, e.g., Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019 (N.J.
1993) (finding oppression but ordering the reinstatement of a minority shareholder as a director rather
than ordering dissolution).
92. See Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 394 (Or. 1973).
93. For a case exhibiting the traditional reluctance to dissolve a solvent corporation and viewing
dissolution as an extreme remedy, see Patton v. Nicholas, 279 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. 1955) (finding
oppression but ordering the payment of reasonable dividends rather than dissolution).
94. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 25, at 30-31.
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statutory remedy of dissolution.95 This form of relief is less harsh than
dissolution and often gives both parties what they want most.96 The majority
gets to run the business as it sees fit, unfettered by the continued participation
of the minority,97 while, at the same time, the minority receives the fair value
of its investment.
D. Conclusion
In conclusion, the classic freezeout scheme involves a financial aspect
(failure to pay salary or dividends to the minority) and a participatory aspect
(restricted access to corporate decision-making or information), is
accompanied by majority self-dealing, and culminates in an attempt to force
the minority to sell its stock to the majority at an unfairly low price. It bears
noting, however, that not all of these elements need to be present for a court
to find a breach of fiduciary duty. Any one of the elements may, by itself, be
sufficient to sustain a breach of fiduciary duty finding.98 Other unfair conduct
by the majority also may lead to such a finding.99 Preventing a freezeout,
95. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980); Sauer v. Moffitt, 363
N.W.2d 269 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230 (Mont. 1983); McCauley v.
Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); In re Wiedy’s Furniture Clearance
Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 564 P.2d 277
(Or. 1977); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 1973); Davis v. Sheerin, 754
S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1988); but see Gianotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725 (Va. 1990) (holding that
statutory remedies are exclusive and court has no residual equitable power to order a buyout).
Although it is usual for the court to order the corporation or the majority to buy the minority’s shares
at fair value upon a finding of oppression, one unusual case permitted the minority to purchase the
majority’s shares because the deal among the parties permitted the minority to run the enterprise. See
Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382 (N.J. 1996).
96. See Thompson, supra note 31, at 721-22 (arguing that “[t]he recognition of the possibility of
a buyout as a less drastic remedy undoubtedly has contributed to the breakdown of the traditional
judicial and legislative resistance to granting relief where there is dissension among shareholders”).
97. In a number of jurisdictions, the majority may elect to purchase the minority’s shares at fair
value once a petition seeking dissolution for oppression is filed. See id. at 718-19 nn. 126, 127
(collecting statutes). This election removes fault issues from the case and converts the proceeding into
one designed to appraise the value of the minority’s shares. In jurisdictions permitting this procedure,
the parties are in effect able to get a no-fault business divorce.
98. See, e.g., Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1993) (finding oppression based solely
on the minority’s removal from the board of directors).
99. For example, in Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1988), the minority
shareholder did not challenge the lack of corporate employment and the jury found that dividends were
not suppressed. The illegal conduct consisted of: (a) denying the 45% shareholder’s interest on the
ground that he had previously made a gift of that interest to the 55% shareholder; (b) contributing
corporate funds to a profit sharing plan in which only the majority shareholder had an interest; and (c)
spending the corporation’s money to pay the majority shareholder’s attorneys’ fees. The appellate
court noted the absence of “some of the typical ‘squeeze out’ techniques used in closely held
corporations” but held that the majority’s conduct constituted a breach of fiduciary duty and
“oppression” for which dissolution might be ordered because it frustrated the minority’s reasonable
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however, is at the core of the special fiduciary duty rules applicable to
shareholders in closely held corporations. Where such misconduct occurs, a
court may provide traditional compensatory remedies, order dissolution, or
compel a buyout of the minority interest at a judicially determined fair value.
II. DELAWARE LAW ON CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATIONS: DO ANY
SPECIAL DUTIES EXIST?
A. The Pre-Nixon Cases
Prior to the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon v. Blackwell,100
two Chancery Court cases considered the problem of shareholder duties in
closely held corporations. These cases express divergent views on whether
special shareholder duties exist in closely held corporations.
The first of the pre-Nixon cases, Ueltzhoffer v. Fox Fire Development
Co.,101 denied in part a minority shareholder’s petition for relief on grounds
that might well be accepted in other jurisdictions. In this case, the Marta and
Ueltzhoffer families formed two corporations that had roles in building and
selling single family homes and townhouses on specific plots of land. The
first of these corporations, Drummond Builders, Inc., was responsible for the
construction work. Drummond’s stock was evenly split between the two
families. Ueltzhoffer drew a salary from Drummond in his capacity as
construction supervisor. The second corporation, Fox Fire Development Co.,
was responsible for office matters, such as accounting and financial work,
and sold the finished homes to purchasers. The stock in Fox Fire was split
sixty/forty between the Marta and Ueltzhoffer families, although the court
found that the families nevertheless agreed to split any profits equally.102
The Fox Fire development project ran into difficulties that caused tension
between the Marta and Ueltzhoffer families. Marta and his daughter believed
that Ueltzhoffer was responsible for cost overruns and construction delays.
Marta also came to believe that Ueltzhoffer was disloyal when he found out
that Ueltzhoffer was discussing a new project with one of Drummond’s
electricians. Ueltzhoffer was removed from his position as construction
supervisor of Drummond. Marta’s daughter then formed a new corporation
owned entirely by her to take over the construction duties at the Fox Fire
investment expectations. Id. at 381-82.
100. 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993). See also infra Part II.B.
101. No. 9871, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 204 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 1991), aff’d, 618 A.2d 90 (Del. 1992)
(affirming based on the Chancery Court’s opinion).
102. See id. at *2-*8.
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project.103 Ueltzhoffer sued the Marta family for, among other things, breach
of fiduciary duty in discharging him from his position at Drummond. He
sought lost wages and a dissolution of Drummond because it was hopelessly
deadlocked and further asked the court to order a buyout of his family’s Fox
Fire shares at fair value.104
The court declined to find that the Marta family had violated any
fiduciary duty to Ueltzhoffer by discharging him from his employment at
Drummond. Although the court found that Ueltzhoffer had performed his
duties as construction supervisor competently,105 the court also found that
this question was not free from doubt and that the Marta family had acted out
of competency concerns in firing Ueltzhoffer, and not solely for the
“improper purpose of freezing him out of the corporate entities.”106
Consequently, the court found that the Marta family had a legitimate
business purpose in firing Ueltzhoffer and denied Ueltzhoffer’s claim for lost
wages.107
Ueltzhoffer presents a case in which it may be relevant whether the court
measures the existence of special shareholder duties from the perspective of
the majority or the minority.108 Under the Massachusetts majority-centered
view, the Ueltzhoffer result is not controversial. If the controlling parties fired
Ueltzhoffer because they truly believed he was incompetent, this surely
represents a legitimate business purpose that cannot be accomplished through
any less harmful alternative. Presumably the controlling parties are entitled to
act on their own view of an employee’s competence without second-guessing
by the court, as long as their motive is not pretextual. In contrast, under the
New York minority-centered view, Ueltzhoffer’s rights were violated. He
invested in Drummond in part because he was looking for work at the time.
The Marta family was aware of his interest in a job.109 The Marta family
could surely have fired Ueltzhoffer if he was incompetent, because no person
has a reasonable expectation of continued employment in such
circumstances. Because the court found Ueltzhoffer competent, however, his
discharge violated his reasonable investment expectations at the time of
Drummond’s formation. As a consequence, Ueltzhoffer does not necessarily
103. See id. at *9-*10.
104. See id. at *1-*2.
105. See id. at *20.
106. Id. at *22.
107. See id.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
109. See Ueltzhoffer, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 204, at *3 (noting that the timing of the corporate
project was excellent because “Ueltzhoffer was out of work and Marta apparently had some interest in
finding a project that his daughter . . . could handle”).
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stand for anything other than the Chancellor’s adherence to the
Massachusetts rather than the New York view of shareholder duties in a
closely held corporation.
Although unnecessary to the result, the Ueltzhoffer court also questioned
the very existence of special shareholder duties. The court noted the absence
of any Delaware authority following Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home,
Inc.110 It also suggested that the Marta family was statutorily entitled to have
Drummond dissolved as a consequence of shareholder deadlock.111 The court
posited that a constructive dissolution was accomplished by the Marta family
when it ceased to use Drummond as contractor on the Fox Fire project
because Drummond had no other business, even though the Marta family did
not petition a court to achieve statutory dissolution or to distribute
Drummond’s assets. For this reason, the court saw nothing improper in
replacing Drummond as construction contractor with a corporation wholly
owned by Marta’s daughter.112
These comments by the Ueltzhoffer court are more troubling. The court
was correct that no previous Delaware cases had followed Wilkes. As the
court noted, however, there was no need to decide the status of Wilkes in
Delaware because the Marta family had complied with the duties established
by Wilkes. That the Marta family was entitled to transfer Drummond’s
business to a corporation owned entirely by one of its shareholders is highly
questionable.
Contrary to the court’s suggestion, Drummond was still an existing
corporation at the time its business was diverted to the Marta family. This
diversion would seem to violate two well-established bodies of law that are
applicable to all corporations, whether publicly or closely held. First, the
Marta family, as officers and directors of Drummond, appears to have
usurped a corporate opportunity belonging to Drummond.113 Second, as a
controlling group, the Marta family appears to have engaged in a self-dealing
transaction that cannot satisfy the Delaware entire fairness test.114 These legal
110. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). See Ueltzhoffer, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 204, at *22; see also
text accompanying notes 70-75.
111. See Ueltzhoffer, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 204, at *22; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226
(1998) (giving the Chancery Court the power to appoint a custodian to dissolve a deadlocked
corporation); § 273 (giving a 50% shareholder the power to dissolve a joint venture).
112. See Ueltzhoffer, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 204, at *22 (arguing that the fiduciary duties of
Marta’s daughter “did not require that she continue in business with Ueltzhoffer”).
113. When a business opportunity is presented to a corporation, an officer or director may not
pursue the opportunity individually if it is in the corporation’s line of business. See, e.g., Kaplan v.
Fenton, 278 A.2d 834, 836 (Del. 1971); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 514 (Del. 1939).
114. In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971), a minority shareholder of a 97%-
owned subsidiary argued that the entire fairness test should apply to the parent’s decision to allocate a
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violations are significant because Drummond was to receive a fifteen percent
profit from its construction work for Fox Fire. Even if Ueltzhoffer was
legally discharged, his family, as fifty percent stockholders of Drummond,
possessed a fifty percent interest in Drummond’s corporate profits. By
diverting Drummond’s business after Ueltzhoffer’s discharge, the Marta
family essentially appropriated to itself the 7.5% of future profits that should
have belonged to the Ueltzhoffers.
The court’s suggestion that it would have been proper for the Marta
family to dissolve Drummond for the purpose of appropriating its business
also seems questionable. If controlling parties have duties not to divert
corporate opportunities to themselves, can they accomplish such diversion
merely by the expedient of dissolving the corporation first? Delaware
authority, albeit in other contexts, supports the proposition that statutorily
authorized action can be illegal if taken for an improper purpose.115 Authority
from other jurisdictions holds that a court of equity should not grant a
dissolution petition, even if shareholders are deadlocked, if the result would
be to permit one shareholder group to divert the corporation’s business to
itself.116 A court of equity, in effect, will not permit itself to be used as an
accomplice in one shareholder’s breach of his fiduciary duty to another.
Perhaps the law of Delaware will eventually hold that, in a deadlock
situation, any fifty percent shareholder has an absolute right to seek and
receive corporate dissolution and then to pursue the dissolved corporation’s
business opportunities.117 In making this suggestion, however, the
business opportunity to itself rather than to the subsidiary. Because the opportunity was not within the
subsidiary’s line of business, the court rejected this claim and applied the business judgment rule in
upholding the parent’s conduct. See id. at 721-22. Had the opportunity been within the subsidiary’s
line of business, however, the entire fairness test presumably would have applied. In these
circumstances, the majority would have to prove fair dealing and fair price in connection with the
transaction. See infra Part III. The latter of these inquiries would seem to require the majority to prove
that declining the business opportunity was a good business decision from the corporation’s
perspective. In Ueltzhoffer, it would seem that Drummond could only have benefitted from pursuing
the opportunity.
115. See Schnell v. Cris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (invalidating a board’s
statutorily authorized decision to advance the date of an annual meeting for the purpose of interfering
with a proxy fight and noting that “inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is
legally possible”).
116. See, e.g., Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 483 N.E.2d 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Wollman v.
Littman, 316 N.Y.S.2d 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970). This principle has been applied to prevent majority
shareholders from using their board and shareholder power to dissolve a corporation for the purpose of
appropriating its business. See, e.g., In re Paine et al., 166 N.W. 1036 (Mich. 1918); Grato v. Grato,
639 A.2d 390 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); Levine v. Styleart Press, Inc., 217 N.Y.S.2d 688 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1961); see also Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1961) (noting that “a partner may not
dissolve a partnership to gain the benefits of the business for himself”).
117. This notion is contrary to In re Arthur Treacher’s Fish & Chips, Inc., 386 A.2d 1162 (Del.
Ch. 1978). In that case, a 50% shareholder sought dissolution pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 273
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Ueltzhoffer court did not consider or respond to any of the obvious legal
objections. As such, it is best viewed as a dictum entitled to little weight.
Ueltzhoffer, therefore, should be understood as holding only that controlling
shareholders breach no duty to the minority as a result of a discharge that is
motivated by legitimate business concerns. Ueltzhoffer is not a freezeout case
and does not hold that a freezeout is beyond the capacity of Delaware courts
to remedy. The Ueltzhoffer court noted that a buyout of the Ueltzhoffers’
stock in Fox Fire was not justified on the facts of the case.118 The implication
is that another set of facts might justify such relief.
Just two months after Ueltzhoffer was decided, the Delaware Court of
Chancery was presented with allegations of a classic shareholder freezeout in
Litle v. Waters.119 The court’s opinion in Litle is squarely within the national
mainstream on the duties of shareholders in closely held corporations. In
Litle, Waters provided the financing and obtained two-thirds of the stock of
two corporations. Litle provided the management for both corporations and
obtained one-third of the stock. Waters later discharged Litle as an executive
of both corporations. He then merged the corporations into a single
corporation that essentially maintained the existing division of stock
ownership between himself and Litle. Waters dominated the board of
directors of the new corporation. After the merger, the new corporation paid
no dividends.120
Litle’s suit did not challenge his discharge. Rather, it challenged the
corporation’s failure to pay any dividends. Litle alleged that dividends were
suppressed as part of a freezeout scheme designed to render his stock
worthless so that Waters could acquire it at a bargain price.121 He argued that
this scheme was especially effective because the corporation was a
Subchapter S corporation. As a consequence, although Litle received no
money from the corporation, he was fully taxable on his share of the
(1998) (allowing a 50% shareholder in a joint venture to obtain dissolution). The defendant, who also
owned 50%, counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty. The court held that counterclaims are not
permitted in a section 273 proceeding. The court also held, however, that allegations of breach of
fiduciary duty are relevant in deciding whether to grant a petition for dissolution. For cases supporting
this view of Arthur Treacher’s, see In re English Seafood (USA) Inc., 743 F. Supp. 281, 285 (D. Del.
1990); In re Southern One-Stop, Inc., No. 7500, 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 492, at *3-*4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 3,
1986); Bachman v. Ontell, No. 7805, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 569, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1984). But cf.
In re Data Processing Consultants, Ltd., No. 8907, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 519, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov.
25, 1987) (arguing that “while Section 273 recognizes a power in this court to deny a petition that
satisfies its minimum standards, such a power should be sparingly exercised”).
118. See Ueltzhoffer, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 204, at *24.
119. No. 12155, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 1992).
120. See id. at *2-*4.
121. See id. at *5.
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corporation’s profits.122 Waters moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim on the ground that the board’s dividend decisions were
protected by the business judgment rule.123
The court denied the motion to dismiss for two reasons. First, the court
viewed the dividend decision as the equivalent of a self-dealing transaction
that implicated the entire fairness test rather than the business judgment
rule.124 Second, the court accepted that a majority shareholder in a closely
held corporation has a fiduciary duty of fairness to the minority that
precludes the use of freezeout tactics.125 The court also accepted the New
York version of this standard and held that a majority shareholder breaches
this duty whenever he violates the reasonable investment expectations of the
minority or commits “a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing
and a violation of fair play.”126
Perhaps the portion of Litle adopting the New York fiduciary duty rules in
closely held corporations has been overshadowed by the Delaware Supreme
Court’s opinion in Nixon v. Blackwell.127 Nevertheless, Litle is significant
because it is the one Delaware case that deals squarely with the question of
whether a freezeout of a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation is
permissible and holds that it is not.
B. Nixon v. Blackwell
The Delaware Supreme Court first considered the problem of closely held
corporations in Nixon v. Blackwell.128 Nixon involved a corporation whose
122. See id. at *4-*5.
123. See id. at *8.
124. See id. at *8-*15.
125. See id. at *18-*26.
126. Id. at *22 (quoting Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (1984)). A later pre-Nixon
Chancery Court case, uncomfortable with the notion that Litle had created a new cause of action for
shareholder oppression based on the New York model, viewed Litle as merely reiterating:
[T]he well-established principle of law that, under Delaware law, the declaration of a dividend,
like any other action of the directors, rests in the discretion of the directors, but that the business
judgment rule does not protect the directors if they grossly or fraudulently abuse the discretion
entrusted to them by the shareholders.
Garza v. TV Answer, Inc., No. 12784, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40, at *19 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 1993).
If Litle does nothing more than apply the business judgment rule and its little-used exceptions to
dividend decisions in closely held corporations, then it provides little protection to minority
shareholders. The business judgment rule is seldom overcome on dividend questions. See, e.g.,
Blackwell v. Nixon, No. 9041, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150, at *12 (Del. Ch. Sept. 26, 1991) (noting that
“[f]ew, if any, cases have involved a set of facts egregious enough” to overturn a dividend decision
subject to the business judgment rule), rev’d on other grounds, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993).
127. 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993). See infra Part II.B.
128. 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993).
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capital structure was divided into Class A voting shares and Class B
nonvoting shares. This structure was the result of a plan devised by the
corporation’s founder, which was designed to permit key executives to
maintain control of the company while allowing family members to
participate in the financial benefits. At the time of the lawsuit, all of the Class
A shares and most of the Class B shares were owned by employees of the
corporation and an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (“ESOP”) formed by
the corporation. The remaining Class B shares were owned by the step-
children of the corporation’s founder. The directors collectively owned
47.5% of the Class A shares. There was no public market for either class of
shares.129 The corporation retained most of its earnings and paid only modest
dividends.130
From time to time the corporation offered to purchase the Class B shares
through a series of self-tender offers. The plaintiffs alleged that these offers
occurred at unfairly low prices.131 However, the record did not contain
enough information for the court to determine whether this allegation was
true.132
The corporation provided a measure of liquidity to the employee
stockholders through two mechanisms. Upon retirement or termination of
employment, employees were entitled to receive their interest in the ESOP in
Class B shares or cash in lieu of shares.133 Upon death or termination of
employment, each Class A shareholder gave the corporation the option to
call his Class A shares and substitute Class B shares. The corporation
purchased key man life insurance policies so that it would have the funds to
purchase Class B shares from the estates of deceased executives.134
The nonemployee Class B stockholders brought suit challenging the low
level of dividend payments, which they alleged were designed to force the
plaintiffs to resell their stock to the corporation at bargain prices, the level of
compensation paid to the executives, and the discriminatory basis upon
which the corporation provided liquidity to employee-stockholders through
the ESOP and key man life insurance policies. The Chancery Court rejected
the first two claims, and no appeal was taken. On the third claim, the
Chancery Court held that the directors and controlling stockholders breached
129. See id. at 1370-71.
130. See id. at 1373.
131. See id. at 1371.
132. See id. at 1371 n.3 (noting that “[t]he record does not clearly reveal the relationship of the
various tender offer prices to the current fair value of the stock measured by any traditional valuation
method”).
133. See id. at 1371.
134. See id. at 1371-72.
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their fiduciary duty to the nonemployee Class B stockholders by providing
liquidity to the employee stockholders on a discriminatory basis.135
The Supreme Court applied the entire fairness test to determine the
legality of providing liquidity through the ESOP and key man life insurance
policies.136 The court held that the directors and controlling stockholders
sustained their burden of proving entire fairness.137 It relied heavily on the
fact that the corporation’s capital structure was a direct result of planning by
the corporation’s founding stockholder. The founder himself had begun the
practice of purchasing key man life insurance policies to repurchase Class B
stock of retiring or deceased employees.138 The court also noted that the
corporation received benefits by maintaining an ESOP and making certain
that stock did not pass out of the hands of employees or the founder’s
relatives.139 In these circumstances, the court squarely rejected the equal
opportunity rule of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.140 and held that the
corporation could provide liquidity to employee-stockholders that was not
available to nonemployee-stockholders.141
Had the court gone no further, its opinion would not be controversial. The
equal opportunity rule is disfavored in most jurisdictions that recognize the
existence of special shareholder duties in closely held corporations.142
Indeed, the rule has been abandoned in Massachusetts, the jurisdiction that
created it.143 Moreover, the equal opportunity rule is of questionable
legitimacy. It is facially in accord with Aristotle’s first principle of justice:
similarly situated people should be treated similarly.144 It is not at all obvious,
however, that the employee-stockholders in Nixon are in fact similarly
situated relative to the nonemployee-stockholders. Perhaps their interest in
stock ownership is congruent with employment in a way that is not
applicable to nonemployee’s stockholders.145 If one were to take this view,
135. See id. at 1373.
136. See id. at 1375; see also infra Part III.
137. See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1375-79.
138. See id. at 1379.
139. See id. at 1377, 1379.
140. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
141. See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1376-77 (distinguishing between equal and fair treatment).
142. See supra note 35.
143. See supra text accompanying note 36.
144. See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, bk. V, ch. 2, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1004
(McKeon ed.. 1941).
145. The same might be said of the situation present in Donahue itself. In that case, a founding
shareholder sought to sell his stock back to the company in anticipation of his retirement. The fairness
of the sale price was not disputed. The minority stockholders were relatives of the other founder, who
had died. The existing minority shareholders were not involved in management of the business. The
minority shareholders objected to the corporation’s purchase of the retiring shareholder’s stock on the
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then Nixon is justified by Aristotle’s second principle of justice: dissimilarly
situated people should be treated dissimilarly.146
Judged by the standards of the jurisdictions that accept the existence of
special shareholder duties in closely held corporations but reject the equal
opportunity rule, the result in Nixon is unexceptional. Jurisdictions following
the Massachusetts, majority-centered view would undoubtedly hold that the
directors pursued legitimate business policies in providing liquidity to
employee-stockholders through the ESOP and key man life insurance
policies.147 The question would be more difficult in jurisdictions that accept
the New York, minority-centered view.148 It is not at all clear how to apply
the reasonable investment expectations test to cases involving stockholders
who received their stock through gift or bequest rather than investment.
Presumably, the reasonable expectations of the nonemployee-stockholders in
Nixon would be derived from the nature and logic of the founding
stockholder’s plan.149 Measured by this standard, jurisdictions following the
New York approach would probably find no breach of fiduciary duty for the
reasons given in Nixon.
The Nixon court did, however, go on to make additional statements
regarding the law of closely held corporations that are significantly more
controversial than its specific holding. The court noted that it wished to
consider “[w]hether there should be any special, judicially-created rules to
‘protect’ minority stockholders of closely held Delaware corporations.”150
The court’s answer was resoundingly in the negative. The court noted that
Delaware has passed legislation enabling shareholders in closely held
ground that the minority did not have equal access to liquidity. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510-11.
Although the Donahue court upheld this claim, the retiring founder might be seen as occupying a
different position than the passive minority shareholders. The retiring founder never contemplated
owning stock in a corporation he was not active in managing. See id; see also Oesterle, supra note 39,
at 894 (opposing the equal opportunity rule and noting that “[m]ost buy-outs of senior investors
facilitate their retirement at a time when they are no longer productive managers”).
146. Aristotle’s second principle of justice requires that dissimilarly situated people be treated
“proportionately, with reference to some rational, impersonal standard.” Gareth Morley, A Just
Measure of Pain? Sentencing and Sentencing Reform in the Era of the Charter, 55 U. TORONTO FAC.
L. REV. 269, 270 (1997).
147. See supra text accompanying note 37.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
149. For example, in Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1993), the Supreme Court of
New Jersey accepted the reasonable expectations test as the measure of oppression. See id. at 1029.
The minority shareholders challenged the provision of jobs to the majority shareholder and his family
but not to the son and daughter-in-law of the minority shareholder. See id. The court rejected this claim
because the rationale of the founding shareholder’s original disposition of stock was to allow the
majority to run the business with the minority playing a passive role. See id. at 1033 (noting that “the
corporate founders never intended that [the minority shareholder] manage” the corporation).
150. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993).
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corporations to modify their relationships by contract.151 Consequently, the
court believed that shareholders should protect themselves in this fashion
rather than expecting courts to provide protection.152
The court’s suggestion that the power to contract reduces the need for
judicial protection of minority shareholders in closely held corporations is
plausible. Minority shareholders who invest in a closely held corporation
(unlike the plaintiffs in Nixon, who received their stock by way of a
testamentary gift and future transfers), may contract to secure employment, a
given level of dividends, board membership, or anything else that is
important to their decision to join the venture.153 Minority shareholders may
bargain for provisions limiting the compensation and other self-dealing
opportunities of the majority. Minority shareholders may seek contracts that
provide for dissolution or a buyout at a fair price, as determined by a neutral
party or a court, under specified circumstances. In this manner, minority
shareholders may protect themselves against most elements of a freezeout
scheme. If majority stockholders do not agree to such provisions at the time
the minority is to purchase its stock, the minority is fairly put to the choice of
making the investment or foregoing special protection against future
oppression.
There are, nevertheless, significant limitations on the minority’s ability to
protect itself by contract. The circumstances of potential future oppression
cannot always be foreseen at the time of contracting.154 To the extent such
circumstances can be foreseen, it may be impossible to formulate contractual
standards that are sufficiently certain and definite for a court to enforce.155
151. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (1998). In the absence of such statutory authority,
contracts that unduly limit the board’s discretion may be void as against public policy. See, e.g.,
McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934). The statutory close corporation provisions
explicitly permit shareholder agreements that limit the board’s discretion or replace the board entirely
and provide for management by the shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 350, 351 (1998).
Perhaps because so few eligible corporations take advantage of statutory close corporation status, see
infra note 157, the Delaware legislature has now provided all corporations with broader contractual
freedom. The current text of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1998) states: “The business and affairs
of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as
may be otherwise provided . . . in its certificate of incorporation.” (emphasis added).
152. See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1380.
153. For a catalogue of measures designed to protect minority shareholders against a freezeout,
see 2 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 17, ch. 9.
154. In Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1988), one of the chief factors supporting a
finding of oppression and a court-ordered buyout of the minority interest was the majority’s denial of
the minority’s very status as a shareholder. See id. at 381. The majority shareholder maintained that the
minority shareholder had previously made a gift of his 45% interest to the majority. Id. It is hard to
imagine a lawyer anticipating such oppressive conduct in advance and contracting for a buyout in the
event it comes to fruition.
155. For example, in Litle v. Waters, No. 12155, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10,
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Most importantly, closely held corporations are the corporations least likely
to involve lawyers making extensive efforts to assure that the corporation is
formed in accordance with the wishes of all parties.156 The smaller the
enterprise, the larger the relative transaction costs of contracting for special
relationships between shareholders. One simply cannot expect a two-person
dry cleaning operation to run with the same level of attorney supervision as a
Fortune 500 company. The fact that only a small percentage of eligible
corporations elect to take advantage of statutory close corporation provisions
of the type referenced in Nixon provides some evidence that closely held
corporations tend to lack access to lawyers.157
In other spheres, the law is relatively forgiving of the closely held
corporation’s lack of access to lawyering. For example, although a
corporation’s bylaws may normally be amended only through the procedures
specified in the bylaws themselves, courts have recognized that amendments
may be accomplished by conduct where all the parties with the power to
amend the bylaws act in a manner inconsistent with the bylaws for a
significant period of time.158 To take another example, board action normally
takes place only at a duly called meeting.159 Courts, however, have
legitimized conduct taken with the assent or acquiescence of all directors or
shareholders, even though no board meeting to approve the conduct
occurred.160 One cannot imagine either of these examples being applied to a
1992), a closely held corporation elected Subchapter S tax status. This status provides for pass-through
taxation and makes every shareholder liable to pay tax on his pro rata share of the corporation’s profits
whether or not the corporation pays dividends. The minority shareholder alleged that he consented to
the Subchapter S election based on a promise that the corporation would pay dividends sufficient to
allow the minority shareholder to pay his portion of the tax on the corporation’s profits. The court
agreed with the majority’s argument that “the alleged agreement [was] too vague and indefinite to be
enforceable as a contract.” Id. at *16.
156. See 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 17, § 2.20, at 54 (noting
“[t]he widespread reluctance of the participants in small businesses to obtain competent legal advice”).
The authors do suggest, however, that “preventive legal advice is inexpensive when compared to the
cost of litigation which may result from the failure to seek out competent legal assistance.” Id.
157. See id. § 1.19 (noting that only about 5% of eligible corporations nationwide elect statutory
close corporation status).
158. See, e.g., Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1930); Schraft v.
Lewis, 686 P.2d 865 (Kan. 1984); Baywood Country Club v. Estep, 929 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.
1996). For example, in the leading case of Keating v. K–C–K Corp., 383 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. App. 1964),
the bylaws provided for a board composed of three directors. In 1957 and 1958, three directors were
elected. Without any formal action to amend the bylaws, however, four directors were elected in 1959,
1960, 1961, and 1962. The court held that this consistent course of conduct was in itself sufficient to
effect an amendment to the bylaws to create four directorships, so that the number of directors could
not thereafter be reduced to three without a new bylaw amendment. See id. at 71.
159. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(f) (1998) (providing that board action without a
meeting requires unanimous written consent).
160. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 294-98 (7th ed.
1995).
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publicly held corporation, in which the regularity of procedures provides
substantial protection to passive shareholders who take no part in corporate
affairs and in which substantial staffs of lawyers are on hand to guarantee
such regularity.
One wonders, therefore, at Nixon’s suggestion that minority shareholders
seeking protection from majority oppression need only make sufficient
contracts.161 It would seem to be the courts’ job to either enforce the spirit of
the deal between the parties, even in cases where no formal contract exists,162
or to ask what protections the parties would have contracted for had they
considered a particular question at the corporation’s inception.163
As a consequence of the foregoing, there is substantial reason to question
whether Nixon has permanently established that Delaware will not recognize
any common law protections for minority shareholders in closely held
corporations. As presented to the Delaware Supreme Court, Nixon was not a
freezeout case, and the court was therefore not required to consider whether
closely held corporations require special rules.164 Moreover, the Nixon
court’s reliance on contract as a means for safeguarding the interests of
minority shareholders in closely held corporations is, at the very least, open
to serious debate and received only cursory consideration from the court.
This debate is better reserved for a case in which something turns on the
court’s determination of the legal status of closely held corporations.
161. In arguing against this aspect of Nixon, one commentator has suggested that the participants
in a closely held corporation usually choose the corporate form to achieve limited liability and
corporate tax attributes rather than to vary the governance rules that would ordinarily apply to
partnerships. See Robert B. Thompson, The Taming of Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L.
REV. 921, 935 (1995).
162. For a discussion of the quasi-contractual nature of the duties owed to minority shareholders
in closely held corporations, see supra note 39.
163. This is the approach suggested by two leading commentators. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 6, at 250 (arguing that “[t]he right inquiry is always what the parties would have contracted
for had transaction costs been nil”). Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel recognize:
It makes sense . . . to have greater judicial review of terminations of managerial (or investing)
employees in closely held corporations than would be consistent with the business judgment rule.
The same approach could be used with salary, dividend, and employment decisions in closely held
corporations where the risks of conflicts of interest are greater.
Id. at 245. These commentators also stress, however, that heightened fiduciary duty standards in
closely held corporations may be difficult to administer. See id. at 247-48.
164. In its posture before the Delaware Supreme Court, Nixon was not a freezeout case because
the Chancery Court’s decision upholding the majority’s refusal to pay significant dividends was not
appealed, and there was no evidence before the court relating to the fairness of the price at which the
corporation offered to purchase the minority interest through a series of self-tender offers. See supra
text accompanying notes 131, 134. Had these issues been present, the Delaware Supreme Court would
have been required to consider classic freezeout allegations.
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C. Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy
Since their decision in Nixon, the Delaware Supreme Court has returned
to the problem of closely held corporations in only one case, Riblet Products
Corp. v. Nagy,165 which the court received through a circuitous route. This
case involved a minority shareholder who was also president and chief
executive officer of a corporation. The executive’s employment contract
stipulated that if he was fired other than for cause, he was entitled to certain
stipulated benefits. The executive was fired. He brought suit against the
contracting shareholders in federal district court in Indiana seeking
contractual benefits on the ground that he was fired without cause. He also
sued the controlling shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty.166
The jury found that the executive had been fired without cause and
awarded full contractual benefits payable by the corporation.167 Judgment
was entered on these findings, and this portion of the judgment was affirmed
by the Seventh Circuit. The trial court also entered a judgment making the
controlling shareholders jointly and severally liable for the corporation’s
contractual payments and requiring the controlling shareholders to pay
$375,000 in punitive damages.168 The controlling shareholders’ liability
depended on their conduct constituting a breach of fiduciary duty to the
minority shareholder.169
In considering “the question whether corporate law requires controlling
shareholders to act as fiduciaries toward minority shareholder-employees,”170
the Seventh Circuit noted that Indiana would answer this question in the
affirmative in accordance with Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.171
However, Delaware substantive law governed the case. The Seventh Circuit
noted that there was some question whether Delaware would follow Wilkes
and stated that “[t]he Supreme Court of Delaware has never addressed the
question.”172 The Seventh Circuit’s failure even to cite the Delaware
Supreme Court’s opinion in Nixon v. Blackwell provides eloquent testimony
that Nixon may not have settled as much as the broad language of the opinion
suggests. The Seventh Circuit viewed Ueltzhoffer v. Fox Fire Development
165. 683 A.2d 37 (Del. 1996).
166. Nagy v. Riblet Prods. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 573-74 (7th Cir. 1996) (Nagy).
167. See id. at 574.
168. See id. at 574-75.
169. See id. at 574.
170. Id. at 576; see supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
171. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
172. Nagy, 79 F.3d at 577.
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Co.173 as the only relevant Delaware authority. As the Seventh Circuit noted
correctly, Ueltzhoffer does not settle whether Delaware recognizes special
fiduciary duties in closely held corporations.174
 “Recognizing the nationwide application of Delaware corporate law, and
the benefits of making that law certain,” the Seventh Circuit certified the
question regarding the existence and extent of the controlling shareholders’
fiduciary duties to the Delaware Supreme Court.175 The Delaware Supreme
Court accepted the certification. As reformulated by the Delaware Supreme
Court, the certified question was: “[w]hether majority stockholders of a
Delaware corporation may be held liable for violation of a fiduciary duty to a
minority stockholder who is an employee of the corporation under an
employment contract with respect to issues involving that employment.”176
It is worth noting that the Delaware Supreme Court formulated an
extremely narrow question. The Court might have asked whether majority
stockholders have any fiduciary duty to minority stockholders. Although the
Seventh Circuit noted that the most likely source of any such duty was
Wilkes’s idea that the majority in a closely held corporation owes a special
fiduciary duty to the minority, the Delaware Supreme Court might simply
have answered this question in the negative on the authority of Nixon v.
Blackwell.177
Addressing the certified question, the court took the view that the
employment contract was dispositive of the plaintiff’s rights.178 Therefore,
the plaintiff’s remedies were solely against the corporation for breach of the
employment contract and were limited to the contractually stipulated
damages. No relief lay against the controlling shareholders. This result seems
entirely correct. Although one may argue whether courts should create
special fiduciary duties to protect minority shareholders where no explicit
contract between the parties exists, there is no cause for judicial protection of
minority rights where the minority has negotiated an extensive contract
directly addressing the relevant issues.179
After answering the certified question in the negative, the Riblet court
gave a clue as to why it formulated such a narrow question. The court
suggested that it wanted to leave open the possibility that Delaware law may
173. No. 9871, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 204 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 1991).
174. See Nagy, 79 F.3d at 577; see also supra text accompanying notes 101-18.
175. Id.
176. Riblet Prod. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 39 (Del. 1996) (Riblet).
177. See supra Part II.B.
178. Riblet, 683 A.2d at 40.
179. See Nagy, 79 F.3d at 577 (noting that “the label ‘fiduciary’ does not trump a real contract; it
is a gap-filling approach”).
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find a breach of the majority’s fiduciary duty to the minority in other
circumstances. The court specifically noted: “This is not a case of breach of
fiduciary duty to Nagy qua stockholder. . . . Nagy does not allege that his
termination amounted to a wrongful freeze out of his stock interest . . . nor
does he contend that he was harmed as a stockholder by being terminated.”180
Because the Riblet court reaffirmed Nixon’s principle that the duties of
majority shareholders are no different in closely and publicly held
corporations and noted that “Wilkes has not been adopted as Delaware
law,”181 the implication is that protection for minority shareholders against
freezeout techniques must flow from the general fiduciary duties that
majority stockholders owe to the minority in all corporations. This possibility
is the subject of Part III.
D. Conclusion
In conclusion, three Delaware cases, Nixon v. Blackwell, Riblet Products
Corp. v. Nagy, and Ueltzhoffer v. Fox Fire Development Co., have suggested
that the controlling parties of a closely held corporation owe no special
fiduciary duties to the minority. However, none of these cases involved a
classic freezeout. There is, therefore, some hope that, when confronted with
real evidence of a freezeout, the Delaware Supreme Court may reconsider its
views in Nixon and Riblet and hold, as the Chancery Court held in Litle v.
Waters, that the majority owes a fiduciary duty of fairness to the minority in
the close corporation context.
It is worth noting in this regard that the Delaware Supreme Court has
been particularly flexible when it believes that past holdings or dicta were
mistaken. For example, in a trilogy of cases decided between 1977 and 1979,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that the majority could not effect a
freezeout merger for the sole purpose of eliminating the minority interest.182
In 1983, the court reversed itself and endorsed freezeout mergers subject to
the majority’s duty to deal fairly with the minority and pay a fair price.183
Similarly, in 1990 the Delaware Supreme Court suggested in dicta that
selling control of a corporation did not trigger the strict rules of judicial
review applicable to takeover defense when the target company’s board
decides to sell the entire company.184 In 1994, when confronted with a case
180. Riblet, 683 A.2d at 40.
181. Id. at 39; see also id. at 39-40 n.2.
182. See Roland Int’l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d
969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. Int’l General Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
183. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
184. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-51 (Del. 1990).
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squarely raising the issue, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the same
rules of judicial review apply to takeover defenses when only control of a
company is sold as apply when the entire company is sold.185 Thus, it seems
that the Delaware Supreme Court agrees with Emerson that “a foolish
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.”186
Moreover, even if the Delaware Supreme Court stands firm in its refusal
to create special rules for closely held corporations, there is no reason the
Delaware courts cannot employ Delaware’s general law on the fiduciary
duties of majority shareholders to prevent freezeouts in closely held
corporations. Riblet almost invites such a result in a future case.
III. THE ENTIRE FAIRNESS TEST AS A METHOD OF PROTECTING MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS AGAINST OPPRESSION
Generally, shareholders have no rights or obligations relative to the
corporation or the other shareholders save those contained in their stock
contracts.187 Controlling shareholders, however, have a fiduciary duty to the
minority in all corporations, including publicly held corporations.188 This
duty is a consequence of the power that controlling shareholders have to
direct the corporation’s affairs. Although the traditional corporate model
posits that directors, rather than shareholders, direct corporate activity, this
model breaks down where a single shareholder or group of shareholders
owns a controlling interest. In such situations, the board is usually just a
proxy for the controlling shareholder or group. The power incident to control
gives rise to equivalent responsibility.
185. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). For
an analysis of QVC’s effect on Delaware takeover jurisprudence, see Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the
Law of Hostile Takeovers: The Impact of QVC and its Progeny, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 945 (1995).
186. RALPH W. EMERSON, SELF RELIANCE AND OTHER ESSAYS 24 (Dover Thrift 1993).
187. Indeed, a controlling shareholder is not required to sell his stock even if such refusal forces
the corporation to forego a beneficial transaction. See, e.g., Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d
840, 845 (Del. 1987). If the controlling shareholder does sell his block, he is allowed to keep any
premium and need not share it with the minority. See, e.g., Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436,
442 (Del. 1996). A director has no more duty to the minority when he acts with respect to his shares
than a controlling shareholder. See, e.g., Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs. Indus., Inc., [1990-1991
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 95,617, at 97,887 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1990) (holding that
a management buyout group, which owned 48% of the corporation’s stock and controlled a majority of
board seats, had no duty to sell to a competing bidder “merely because the sale would profit the
minority” (quoting Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987))).
188. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (noting that “[a] director is a fiduciary,”
and “[s]o is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders”); Southern Pacific Co. v.
Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919) (noting that “[t]he majority has the right to control; but when it
does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much so as the corporation itself or its
officers and directors”).
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As long as all stockholders share proportionately in the costs and benefits
of corporate decisions, controlling stockholders may direct corporate activity
in whatever manner they choose. The controlling interest simply conveys this
privilege. If the minority is treated the same as the majority, the decisions of
the controlling shareholder’s proxies on the board are protected by the
business judgment rule and may not be second-guessed by the minority.189
Where the controlling shareholder or group allocates disproportionate
benefits to itself, however, different rules apply. In such circumstances, the
controlling shareholders and their directors are not protected by the business
judgment rule and must carry the burden of proving the “entire fairness” of
any self-dealing transaction to have their conduct upheld.190 The entire
fairness test requires the majority to proceed in a manner that is both
procedurally and substantively fair.191 It has been applied rigorously by the
Delaware courts.
The fair dealing prong of the entire fairness test “embraces questions of
when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated,
and disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the
stockholders were obtained.”192 The fair price prong of the entire fairness test
embodies the concept that the challenged transaction must be fair to the
minority as a substantive business matter.193 Whereas the business judgment
rule generally insulates the majority’s conduct from substantive judicial
review in cases subject to the rule, the entire fairness test requires the court to
exercise its independent business judgment. The self-dealing party has the
burden of proof in showing the transaction’s entire fairness.194 This burden is
189. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
190. See id. (holding that the entire fairness test applies whenever the majority “receives
something from the [corporation] to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders”).
191. Although cases generally analyze the entire fairness test in terms of its fair dealing and fair
price prongs, the test is theoretically unitary in that the court will weigh the totality of all factors
relating to either prong to arrive at a determination of whether a self-dealing transaction is entirely fair.
See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (noting that “[t]he test for fairness is not
a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and fair price,” and “[a]ll aspects of the issue must be
examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness”). As a consequence, the majority can
satisfy its burden of proving entire fairness even if some misconduct is found. See Kahn v. Lynch
Communications Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995) (finding the entire fairness test satisfied despite
coercive conduct by a controlling shareholder); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156
(Del. 1995) (finding the entire fairness test satisfied despite a lack of due care by the board).
192. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
193. See, e.g., id.
194. See id. at 703. The burden shifts to the party challenging a self-dealing transaction if the
transaction is approved by a properly functioning committee of disinterested directors, see, e.g., Kahn
v. Lynch Communications Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (noting that “the majority . . .
must not dictate the terms of the merger” and that “the special committee must have real bargaining
power that it can exercise with the majority . . . on an arms length basis”), or a majority of
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difficult to meet under Delaware law. The Delaware courts have viewed the
invocation of the entire fairness test as bordering on outcome-determinative
because “the standard of entire fairness [is] so exacting.”195
This Part considers the extent to which the Delaware entire fairness test
protects minority shareholders in closely held corporations against
oppression by the majority. First, Section A considers the application of the
entire fairness test in the context of explicit freezeout mergers. Section B then
considers the application of the entire fairness test to cases in which the
freezeout scheme is more subtle. Finally, Section C considers the remedies
available under Delaware law for violation of the entire fairness test.
A. Freezeout Mergers
The majority in a closely held corporation may eliminate the minority
explicitly by effecting a freezeout merger. An example will illustrate the
mechanics of such a merger. Assume that the majority shareholder owns
seventy percent of Corporation A and the minority owns thirty percent. The
majority forms a new entity (Corporation B) of which it owns one hundred
percent. The majority shareholder then forces a merger of Corporation A into
Corporation B with Corporation B surviving the merger and the minority
shareholder of Corporation A receiving cash as the merger consideration.196
The end result is that the majority shareholder owns one hundred percent of
Corporation B, which succeeds to all the assets and liabilities of Corporation
A,197 and the minority shareholder has been removed from the business. The
majority has achieved a forced sale of the minority’s shares for the merger
consideration.
The Delaware Supreme Court has explicitly endorsed the legitimacy of
the majority using a freezeout merger to eliminate the minority.198 The entire
disinterested shareholders acting after full disclosure, see, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422,
429 (Del. 1997).
195. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988) (quoting AC
Acquisitions v. Anderson, 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)).
196. Effecting the merger of a Delaware corporation requires approval by the board and a simple
majority of shares. See DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 251(b), (c) (1998). As a consequence, the 70%
shareholder in our example has the raw power to effect a freezeout merger. Further, there is no
difficulty in using cash as the merger consideration. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)(5) (1998)
(requiring the plan of merger to contain the merger consideration, which may be “cash”).
197. This is a legal consequence of the merger. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1998).
198. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme Court
reversed a trilogy of cases decided within the preceding six years, see supra note 182, and held that the
majority may effect a freezeout merger for no purpose other than eliminating minority interests. This
rule is not universally accepted. See Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d
1112 (Mass. 1986); Alpert v. 28 William St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984).
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fairness test applies to such self-interested mergers.199 Most litigated cases
have involved publicly held corporations. Although many of the same issues
apply to freezeout mergers in closely held corporations, some of these issues
have a different gloss in the close corporation context.
The fair dealing prong of the entire fairness test requires the majority to
employ fair procedures in effecting a freezeout merger. The most common
fair dealing violations fall into three categories. First, the majority fails to
apply procedures that replicate independent, arms-length bargaining.200
Although the failure to achieve arms-length bargaining is not fatal per se,201
the Delaware cases emphasize the importance of such actions as forming an
independent board committee to consider the majority’s merger proposal202
or putting the merger proposal to a majority vote of the disinterested
shareholders.203 In closely held corporations, such procedures are likely to be
Presumably, the Delaware courts would apply the Weinberger rule to closely held corporations.
There is, however, a potential basis for distinction. In publicly held corporations, most shareholders
make impersonal investments. They care only about the total value of their investments rather than
whether such value inheres in stock or cash. See Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A
Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1374-75 (1978). As a result, a freezeout
does not work any hardship as long as the minority receives fair treatment and a fair price. In contrast,
shareholders in closely held corporations often view their investments in a more personal manner.
Thus, the shareholder’s investment in a close corporation may be protected by property rules (the
shareholder may not be deprived of his stock involuntarily) rather than liability rules (the shareholder
may be deprived of his stock only upon payment of fair compensation). See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins
Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974) (refusing to allow a freezeout merger in a closely held corporation).
But see David C. Crago, Fiduciary Duties and Reasonable Expectations: Cash-Out Mergers in Close
Corporations, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 27 (1996) (arguing that the majority should be allowed to employ a
freezeout merger at a fair price to resolve disputes in closely held corporations). On the distinction
between property rules and liability rules, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
199. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
200. See, e.g., Seagraves v. Urstadt Property Co., No. 10307, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 36, at *16
(Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1996) (noting that the failure to institute procedural safeguards “is a factor
evidenc[ing] the absence of fair dealing”); MacLane Gas Co., v. Enserch Corp., No. 10760, 1992 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 260, at *30 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 1992) (finding unfair dealing based on “a total lack of
procedural safeguards”), aff’d, 633 A.2d 369 (Del. 1993).
201. See, e.g., Wiegand v. Berry Petroleum Co., No. 9316, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 37, at *21 n.10
(Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 1991) (noting that the failure to furnish procedural safeguards “constitute[s]
evidence of unfair dealing” but does not “necessarily establish unfair dealing as a matter of law”);
Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 599 (Del. Ch. 1986) (commenting that the
presence of procedural safeguards typically constitutes “indicia of fairness” but that their absence
“does not itself establish any breach of duty”).
202. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983) (noting that the result
“could have been entirely different if [the corporation] had appointed an independent negotiating
committee of its outside directors to deal with [the majority] at arms length.”); Sealy Mattress Co. v.
Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1337 (Del. Ch. 1987) (criticizing the fact that “[n]o independent directors
were put on [the corporation’s] board”).
203. See, e.g., Ryan v. Tad’s Enterprises, Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 692 n.12 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating
that, although a disinterested shareholder vote is not required, “utilization of that structural safeguard,
or its absence, is a factor that this Court will consider in determining whether there was fair dealing”),
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unavailing because there are usually no disinterested directors or
shareholders other than the minority, and, if the minority supports the
transaction, no further difficulties should arise.
There is, however, one procedural feature that is as applicable to closely
held corporations as to publicly held corporations. The courts have been
suspicious of transactions in which publicly held corporations did not hire
independent financial and legal advisors to assess the objective fairness of the
transaction.204 Presumably, in the close corporation context, the majority
should try to reach agreement with the minority on an outside expert to value
the corporation’s shares prior to fixing the merger consideration.205 Given the
larger relative transaction costs in closely held corporations, it may be
unnecessary to hire independent lawyers if the corporation’s lawyer takes a
neutral position.206 Where the corporation’s lawyer is also in effect acting as
the majority’s counsel, however, the minority deserves to be represented by
an independent lawyer at the corporation’s expense.207
Second, failure to make full disclosure is a common ground relied upon
by courts in finding a violation of the fair dealing prong of the entire fairness
test.208 Violating this requirement is especially problematic in a closely held
corporation if it hinders the minority’s ability to exercise appraisal rights in
an intelligent fashion.
Third, the Delaware courts have found unfair dealing when the majority
aff’d, 693 A.2d 1082 (Del. 1997).
204. See, e.g., Ryan, 709 A.2d at 691-93; Sealy Mattress Co., 532 A.2d at 1337.
205. A unilateral attempt by the majority to hire a financial expert to give a fairness opinion would
be suspect. In the context of determining whether the existence of a special committee justifies shifting
the burden of proof on entire fairness, one court noted that a “critical factor in assessing the reliability
and independence of the process employed by a special committee” is the method by which the
committee’s financial and legal advisors are selected. Kahn v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, No.
12489, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 38, at *22 n.6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 1996). In this case, the court noted that
the procedure used “raises questions,” because the special committee’s legal and financial advisors
were referred to the committee by the controlling shareholder’s attorney. Id.
206. In contrast, in a public corporation, the Delaware Chancery Court has noted that “[a] desire to
control costs cannot relieve corporate fiduciaries from their duty to assure that the interests of minority
shareholders in a self-dealing transaction are adequately protected.” Ryan v. Tad’s Enterprises, Inc.,
709 A.2d 682, 693 (Del. Ch. 1996), aff’d, 693 A.2d 1082 (Del. 1997).
207. On the propriety of equal access to legal services in the close corporation context, see Davis
v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1988) (finding oppression based in part on the majority’s use
of corporate funds to pay attorneys’ fees in litigation against the minority).
208. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 708-09, 712) (Del. 1983) (relying on the
majority’s failure to disclose a feasibility study showing that the majority had the capacity to pay extra
merger consideration); Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1339 (Del. Ch. 1987) (noting
that “few, if any, of the facts material to an informed investment decision were disclosed, and the facts
that were disclosed were, in the main, highly misleading”); Kumar v. Racing Corp. of Am., Inc.,
[1990-1991 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 95,896, at 99,422-23 (Del. Ch. Apr. 26,
1991) (granting a preliminary injunction and criticizing the majority’s “deliberate effort to keep
plaintiffs in the dark and thereby prevent them from protecting their rights”).
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uses its power to place the minority in an unfavorable bargaining position
with respect to a freezeout merger. The most common tactics used by the
majority include timing the merger to give the majority an advantage at the
minority’s expense,209 manipulating the market price to make the merger
consideration seem fair,210 and engaging in a hurried rather than deliberative
process in approving the merger.211 The courts have also questioned tactics
that, although legal in an arms-length bargaining situation, suggest less than
the “exacting” standard required by the entire fairness test.212
The typical freezeout tactics in a closely held corporation, if used in
conjunction with a cash-out merger, would seem clearly to violate the fair
dealing prong of the entire fairness test, especially the portion of that prong
that prohibits sharp tactics. Presumably the majority could not fire minority
shareholders, suppress dividends, or deny the minority access to corporate
decision-making and financial records in order to force minority acceptance
of a cash-out merger. Similarly, it should be clear that the majority could not
engage in illegal self-dealing, such as paying itself excessive compensation,
for the purpose of decreasing the corporation’s value prior to effecting a
freezeout merger.
209. See, e.g., MacLane Gas Co., v. Enserch Corp., No. 10760, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 260, at *30
(Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 1992) (finding unfair dealing where the timing of a merger was designed to benefit
the majority), aff’d, 633 A.2d 369 (Del. 1993); Kumar v. Racing Corp. of Am., Inc., [1990-1991
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 95,896, at 99,422-23 (Del. Ch. Apr. 26, 1991) (granting a
preliminary injunction based in part on the abusive timing of a merger).
210. See, e.g., Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1336 (Del. Ch. 1987) (finding
that the majority engaged in “a calculated effort to depress the price of [the company’s stock] until the
minority stockholders were eliminated by merger or some other form of acquisition”).
211. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 706-07, 711 (Del. 1983) (criticizing a
“hurriedly prepared” fairness opinion and noting that the transaction was approved in four business
days).
212. One such case is Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985). In
that case, Olin Corporation purchased 63.4% of Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corporation at a price of $25
per share. Olin promised the seller that it would pay the same price for any minority shares acquired
within one year of the transaction. Shortly after the one-year commitment expired, Olin effected a
freezeout merger in which the minority shareholders received $20 per share. The minority did not
challenge the fairness of the $20 price based on traditional valuation criteria. Rather, the minority
argued that Olin had failed in its duty of entire fairness by waiting until the one-year period had
elapsed to effect the merger. The Delaware Supreme Court denied a motion to dismiss the complaint
and held that “the facts alleged by the plaintiffs regarding Olin’s avoidance of the one year
commitment support a claim of unfair dealing.” Id. at 1106. Although the court recognized that Olin
“had no legal obligation to effect the cash-out merger during the one year period,” the court noted that
“inequitable conduct will not be protected merely because it is legal.” Id. at 1106-07. On remand, the
Chancery Court held, after a full trial, that Olin had not engaged in unfair dealing because there was no
proof that Olin had timed the freezeout merger to avoid the one-year commitment. See Rabkin v. Olin
Corp., [1990 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 95,255, 96,164-68 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1990),
aff’d, 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990). The clear implication of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rabkin,
however, is that the literal wording of the contract notwithstanding, it would have constituted unfair
dealing to delay a freezeout merger for the purpose of avoiding the one-year commitment.
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The Delaware courts have also applied the fair price prong of the entire
fairness test to protect minority rights in freezeout mergers. Traditionally, the
courts employed the Delaware block method to appraise the value of
minority shares dissenting from a merger. This method involved computing a
weighted average of market value, capitalization of earnings value, and
liquidation value the corporation’s.213 It has been criticized as unduly
conservative.214 In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,215 the Delaware Supreme Court
expanded the valuation techniques that a court may use to include “any
techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable by the
financial community.”216 In particular, the Weinberger court approved use of
the discounted cash flow method to value the minority’s shares in a freezeout
merger.217
There is a second valuation context in which the Delaware Supreme
Court has been generous to minority shareholders. In appraising minority
shares dissenting from a merger, a common issue is whether minority shares
should be discounted for minority status and/or illiquidity. Were the minority
to sell its shares in an arms-length transaction, such discounts would surely
be applied by the market. In Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett,218 however, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that in an appraisal proceeding the minority is
entitled to its full pro rata share of the corporation’s value and that no
discounts should be applied.219 In part, the court relied on the fact that the
cash received in an appraisal was a substitute for the minority’s surrender of
its pro rata interest in the corporation “as a ‘going concern.’”220 In addition,
213. See, e.g., Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1145 (Mass. 1979).
214. Presumably a corporation’s value is the higher of going concern value, of which the earnings
value may be a reasonable estimate, and liquidation value. The corporation’s board should follow
whichever course generates the higher value. The Delaware block method understates the value of the
corporation by reducing the value of the corporation’s best option to account for the value of less
valuable options that should not be pursued. See Zenichi Shishido, The Fair Value of Minority Stock in
Closely Held Corporations, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 65, 72 (1993).
215. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
216. Id. at 712-13.
217. See id. at 712; see also Joseph E. Calio, New Appraisals of Old Problems: Reflections on the
Delaware Appraisal Proceeding, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 48-49 (1994) (noting that “[s]ince Weinberger, .
. . the ‘discounted cash flow’ method has become the valuation ‘methodology of choice’ in Delaware
appraisal proceedings”).
218. 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
219. See id. at 1144-45. Maine followed Cavalier Oil in In re Valuation of Common Stock of
McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997 (Me. 1989); see also Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 154 Cal.
Rptr. 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (declining to apply minority or liquidity discount in valuing minority’s
shares pursuant to statutory buyout proceeding); Charland v. Country View Golf Club, Inc., 588 A.2d
609 (R.I. 1991) (same). But see McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. 1986)
(giving the trial judge discretion to decide whether to apply a minority discount); Blake v. Blake
Agency, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (applying an illiquidity discount).
220. Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1145.
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the court noted that applying discounts “unfairly enriches the majority
shareholder who may reap a windfall from the appraisal process by cashing
out a dissenting shareholder.”221
Thus, the entire fairness test provides substantial protection to minority
shareholders in a closely held (or any other) corporation who are subjected to
an explicit freezeout merger. Typical freezeout tactics are a violation of the
fair dealing prong of the test. The Delaware Supreme Court has also
vigorously defended the minority’s right to receive a fair price for its shares.
B. Subtle Freezeout Schemes
Although the entire fairness test may provide minority protection against
explicit freezeout mergers, the freezeout schemes that have been invalidated
in jurisdictions that recognize special fiduciary duties in closely held
corporations are usually more subtle. Consider Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc.222 In that case, the majority shareholders fired a minority
shareholder, paid no dividends, and removed the minority shareholder from
the board of directors. Then, instead of effecting an explicit freezeout merger,
a member of the majority group offered to purchase the minority’s shares for
an amount that the court perceived as unfair.223
The majority is normally not subject to fiduciary duty obligations when it
proposes a voluntary purchase transaction to the minority.224 Does this mean
that Wilkes’s rights would not have been infringed in a Delaware
corporation? The specific result in Wilkes might well be reached in
Delaware. The rule that majority shareholders owe no duty to the minority
when offering to purchase stock in a voluntary transaction is subject to the
requirements that full disclosure be made and coercion not be used.225 Where
221. Id.
222. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
224. It is, for example, well established that a majority shareholder has no obligation to make a
tender offer for the minority interest at a fair price. See, e.g., Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp.,
672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996); In re Marriott Hotel Properties II Ltd. Partnership Unitholders Litig., No.
14961, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 1997); In re Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co.
Shareholders Litig., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 95,898 (Del. Ch. Apr.
30, 1991).
225. See, e.g., Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39-40 (Del. 1996) (noting
that “in the absence of coercion or disclosure violations, the adequacy of the price in a voluntary
tender offer cannot be an issue”); In re Marriott Hotel Properties II Ltd. Partnership Unitholders Litig.,
No. 14961, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 60, at *27 (Del. Ch. June 12, 1996) (stating that “if the transaction is
seen as non-voluntary, then plainly, the fiduciary would act under a duty only to pay a fair price in the
tender offer”); Kahn v. United States Sugar Corp., No. 7313, 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 522, at *17 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 10, 1985) (holding that “because of the highly leveraged nature of the transaction it was
coercive and therefore defendants had an obligation to offer a fair price”); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/5
p1153+Engel.doc 03/22/00   9:27 AM
1999] TOWARD A DELAWARE COMMON LAW 1143
the majority engages in a financial and participatory freezeout by discharging
the minority from employment, suppressing dividends, and removing the
minority from the board to assist a purchase offer, Delaware law has
presumably been violated.
Changing one of the facts in Wilkes makes this a harder case. Suppose the
majority had not offered to purchase Wilkes’s shares at an unfair price. A
freezeout scheme can be equally effective if the majority engages in a
financial and participatory freezeout and then simply waits for the minority
to offer its stock at a bargain price. Does the result in Wilkes change under
Delaware law simply because the minority, under intense pressure, initiates
sale discussions? The result in Wilkes should not change under Delaware law
merely because the majority is sufficiently patient to wait for the minority to
ask to be bought out at a bargain price. If the majority is not permitted to
effect a freezeout merger to acquire Wilkes’s stock at an unfair price or
employ coercive tactics to force Wilkes to accept a purchase offer at an
unfair price, the majority should not be permitted to accomplish indirectly
what it could not accomplish directly.
In Litle v. Waters,226 the Delaware Chancery Court had no difficulty
applying the entire fairness test to a Wilkes-like freezeout scheme in a closely
held corporation. In Litle, a majority shareholder discharged a minority
shareholder and prevented the declaration of any dividends, leaving the
minority shareholder to pay his share of the taxes of a Subchapter S
corporation from independent sources. The minority shareholder alleged that
the majority’s failure to pay dividends was intended to force a sale of the
minority interest at a bargain price. The court denied a motion to dismiss the
complaint in part on the ground that the allegations implicated the entire
fairness test rather than the business judgment rule.227
The court had no difficulty identifying the aspects of self-dealing that
triggered the entire fairness test. The majority shareholder, who also
controlled the board of directors, had two selfish interests in preventing the
declaration of dividends: allowing the corporation to keep its profits
facilitated the retirement of certain loans he had made to the corporation; and
suppressing dividends put pressure on the minority shareholder to sell his
stock to the majority shareholder at the cheapest possible price.228 The court
viewed a second director, who was also an executive, as having a conflict of
A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch. 1984) (holding that the general rule does not apply where an unfair price is
offered and “the disclosures are unlikely to call the unwary stockholder’s attention to the unfairness”).
226. No. 12155, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 1992).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 119-26.
228. See Litle, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS, at *12-*13.
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interest on dividend decisions because withholding dividends increased the
value of his stock appreciation rights.229 In this context, the entire fairness
test presumably requires the majority to prove that it used a fair process in
deciding to withhold dividends and that the withholding of dividends was a
good business decision from the corporation’s perspective. To the extent the
majority withheld dividends to force the minority to sell its stock at a cheap
price or to accomplish other selfish purposes, the entire fairness test would be
violated.
It seems natural to characterize the usual elements of a freezeout scheme
as self-dealing and thereby invoke the entire fairness test to invalidate such
conduct.230 A majority shareholder engages in a freezeout scheme for the
purpose of advancing its interests at the expense of the minority, the very
type of conduct that the entire fairness test is designed to place under close
judicial scrutiny. The difficulty with this approach is that it causes some
tension with the central tenet of Nixon v. Blackwell231 that there are no
special rules governing closely held corporations.232 In publicly held
corporations with a majority stockholder, refusing to pay dividends, a central
component of most freezeout schemes,233 is not thought to involve a self-
dealing transaction.234 This is the square holding of the Delaware Supreme
Court in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien.235
In Sinclair Oil, the court held that the business judgment rule protects
conduct by majority shareholders unless the majority receives a benefit at the
expense of, or to the exclusion of, the minority.236 Minority shareholders
alleged that a ninety-seven percent parent had required a subsidiary to pay
dividends, rather than reinvest profits, because the parent was in need of
cash. The court rejected the argument that the entire fairness test applied to
these dividend decisions and applied the business judgment rule in sustaining
the majority’s conduct. The court reasoned that because all shares received
229. See id. at *13.
230. For an argument that the entire fairness test might apply to disputes in closely held
corporations, see Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close
Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 492-95 (1985).
231. 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993).
232. See id. at 1379-81; see also supra Part II.A.
233. See supra Part I.B.2.
234. Discharging a minority shareholder where the majority is employed might, in contrast,
involve a situation where the majority enjoys a benefit to the minority’s exclusion. Such a discharge
might, therefore, fit more comfortably into the rubric of entire fairness analysis. Even this conclusion,
however, requires the assumption that there is a relationship between the minority’s job and the
minority’s investment, which would not be accepted in the context of a publicly held corporation.
235. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
236. See id. at 720.
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the same pro rata dividend payment, no self-dealing was involved.237
The decision in Sinclair Oil is questionable because the minority alleged
that the parent forced the declaration of dividends to advance the parent’s
selfish interests rather than for any reasons having to do with the business
opportunities of the subsidiary. Presumably, the parent should have
reinvested profits to the extent the subsidiary had available business
opportunities promising expected returns in excess of the corporation’s cost
of capital.238 If the majority shareholders were indeed making such a
calculation unfettered by any conflicts, application of the business judgment
rule would be appropriate. It would not be the court’s province to second-
guess the majority’s cost-benefit calculus. The minority’s claim, however,
was that from the subsidiary’s perspective, the majority was not making a
business judgment decision at all.
Sinclair Oil is representative of a strain of Delaware law that considers
the impact of corporate action by measuring its effect on shares and refuses
to look through the shares to measure the impact on shareholders. So long as
the shares themselves are treated equally, any disproportionate impact on
shareholders is irrelevant. For example, although shares of the same class
must be treated equally,239 the Delaware Supreme Court once approved a
weighted voting scheme (in which every shareholder received one vote for
each of the first fifty shares owned and one vote for every twenty shares
owned thereafter) that reduced a twenty-eight percent shareholder to three
percent of the voting power.240 In this scheme, the shares themselves suffered
no voting disability. They would have had full voting rights if transferred to
another shareholder owning fewer than fifty shares. It was only the status of
their owner, who owned more than fifty shares, that caused the voting
disability.241 The Delaware courts have similarly approved: (a) poison pill
plans that allow all shareholders, other than shareholders exceeding certain
ownership thresholds, to purchase stock at bargain prices upon certain
triggering conditions;242 and (b) a self-tender offer open to all shareholders
237. See id. at 721-22.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
239. This rule flows from the statutory requirement that the attributes of each class of stock must
be stated in the certificate of incorporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (1998).
240. See Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977). In addition to the
holding noted in the text, the court also upheld the weighted voting scheme on the ground that the
Delaware corporation statute explicitly permits deviations from the one share-one vote standard. See
id. at 123; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (1998).
241. See Providence & Worcester, 378 A.2d at 123 (arguing that the voting limitations “are
limitations upon the voting rights of the shareholder, not variations in the voting powers of the stock
per se”).
242. See I DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 1097 (5th ed. 1998) (noting
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except a purported acquiror.243
Delaware’s insistence on the distinction between shares and shareholders
is controversial even in publicly held corporations.244 This distinction is less
tenable in the context of closely held corporations.245 The impact of freezeout
tactics on the minority in closely held corporations is larger than the impact
of potential self-dealing in publicly held corporations. For example, although
the minority in Sinclair Oil was not disinterested on the dividend question,
this question was marginal relative to the situation of the minority in a
closely held corporation. The minority in Sinclair Oil, assuming the truth of
its allegations, was denied the difference between the returns the corporation
could have obtained by reinvesting its profits and the returns the shareholders
obtained individually by investing the dividend payments in external sources.
In a closely held corporation where the minority shareholder does not have a
job, dividend payments are the difference between the minority receiving its
pro rata share of the corporation’s income stream and the minority receiving
no return whatsoever.
Moreover, the problem of self-dealing (broadly understood) in a closely
held corporation is omnipresent. Almost every decision made by the majority
that affects the minority’s employment, participation, or dividends has a
potential freezeout effect and the potential to grant the majority a
disproportionate share of the corporation’s income stream. The majority is
usually employed, which makes every compensation decision a self-dealing
problem. By contrast, the most important self-dealing transactions in publicly
that, in light of Providence & Worcester, courts have presumed that discriminatory poison pill plans
are legal in Delaware).
243. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957-58 (Del. 1985).
244. For example, a number of jurisdictions have invalidated poison pill plans with discriminatory
effects on shareholders. See, e.g., West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1088, 1094-
95 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1234, 1239
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying New Jersey law); R.D. Smith & Co. v. Preway, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 868,
873-75 (W.D. Wis. 1986). In reaching this result, the NL Industries court specifically found that
Providence & Worcester would not be accepted in New Jersey. See NL Industries, 644 F. Supp. at
1235.
245. In the context of a closely held corporation, the court in Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc.,
422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981) took a view sharply divergent from Sinclair Oil. In Smith, a
25% shareholder had veto power over dividend decisions. Because this shareholder repeatedly
exercised this veto, the corporation ended up paying tax penalties for retaining too large a portion of its
earnings. Had the court taken a Sinclair Oil approach, it would have viewed all stockholders as being
in the same situation because each stockholder received a pro rata tax benefit from withholding
dividends and each stockholder took a pro rata risk that a tax penalty would result. In upholding the
majority stockholders’ charge of breach of fiduciary duty, however, the court noted that the vetoing
stockholder had relatively more to gain from withholding dividends because he was in a higher tax
bracket. See id. at 802 n.8. Thus, the Smith court was more than willing to look through the impact on
the shares to see the impact on the stockholders in a closely held corporation.
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held corporations are obvious because the majority stands on both sides of
the transaction. In these cases, the entire fairness test is manifestly applicable
to protect the minority. Subtle self-dealing— the kind that requires us to look
behind the effect on shares to see the effect on shareholders— is a much
smaller problem in publicly held corporations.
In sum, unless the same unique attributes of closely held corporations that
are deemed to justify special fiduciary duty rules in states outside of
Delaware are also deemed to change the nature of what is a self-dealing
transaction in Delaware, the Delaware entire fairness test cannot be
employed to prevent subtle freezeout schemes. With this caveat, Litle’s
application of the entire fairness test to freezeout tactics in a closely held
corporation does not cause any great breach in Delaware law. It offers the
same protection from subtle freezeout schemes that the entire fairness test
manifestly offers in the context of explicit freezeout schemes.
C. Remedies
Ordinarily, appraisal is the exclusive remedy available in Delaware to a
minority shareholder challenging only the fairness of the merger
consideration in a freezeout merger.246 A minority shareholder, however,
may still challenge a merger on breach of fiduciary duty grounds where an
appraisal remedy is inadequate, “particularly where fraud, misrepresentation,
self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable
overreaching are involved.”247 The most typical ground justifying a breach of
fiduciary duty action in the freezeout merger context involves allegations of
failure to satisfy the fair dealing prong of the entire fairness test.248
If fair dealing claims are made prior to the consummation of a merger, an
injunction may be granted.249 However, where the merger has been
consummated, relief presents something of a problem. Injunctive relief to
rescind a consummated merger is a disfavored remedy.250 If the courts were
to grant purely compensatory relief, the plaintiff would receive the difference
between a fair price and the merger consideration. Where the merger
246. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983). Indeed, the only issue that may
be considered in an appraisal proceeding is the fairness of the merger consideration. See Alabama By-
Prods. Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 256-57 (Del. 1991).
247. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
248. See, e.g., Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1105 (Del. 1985).
249. See Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1342 (Del. Ch. 1987) (noting that
injunctive relief is still permissible despite Delaware Supreme Court cases referring to the exclusivity
of the appraisal remedy).
250. See, e.g., Klang v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., No. 15012, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 73
(Del. Ch. May 13, 1997), aff’d on other grounds, 702 A.2d 150 (Del. 1997).
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consideration is fair, however, strict compensatory relief produces no
damages.251 Strict compensatory relief essentially eliminates the independent
significance of the fair dealing prong of the entire fairness test.
As a consequence, the Delaware Supreme Court has held out the
possibility that a plaintiff may receive rescissory damages upon a finding that
the entire fairness test has been violated.252 If the merger consideration is fair
at the time of consummation, and the value of the plaintiff’s corporation
increases subsequent to the merger, rescissory damages will produce a
positive recovery. This form of relief demonstrates that the Delaware
Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to infuse the fair dealing prong of
the entire fairness test with significance.253 It also demonstrates that the
Delaware Supreme Court has been creative in fashioning relief to redress
minority shareholder grievances.
Should the entire fairness test come to prevent freezeout schemes in
closely held corporations that do not involve explicit freezeout mergers,
compensatory and equitable relief of the type available nationwide should
also be available in Delaware.254 Two staples of national relief are more
questionable in Delaware: the right to order dissolution for oppression and a
buyout of the minority interest in lieu of dissolution.255
Unlike other states, Delaware does not have a statute permitting a court of
equity to dissolve a corporation based on a finding of oppression. In 1960,
the Delaware Supreme Court recognized a limited common law power to
dissolve a solvent corporation based on misconduct.256 This case, which was
decided before the modern trend liberalizing use of the dissolution remedy
began, characterizes dissolution as an extreme remedy applicable in only
251. Cf. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L. Hand, J.) (requiring proof of damage
causation to allow recovery for breach of the duty of care).
252. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 370-71 (Del. 1993); Weinberger, 457
A.2d at 714. Rescissory damages can, however, be difficult to measure in the merger context unless
the successor corporation preserves the business of the disappearing corporation in its original form.
Perhaps for this reason, the Weinberger court noted that the Chancellor may award rescissory damages
if he “considers them susceptible of proof and a remedy appropriate to all the issues of fairness before
him.” Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
253. Other jurisdictions have not been as vigilant. See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore
Ohio R.R., 875 F.2d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 1989) (concluding that “Maryland law, unlike Delaware law
. . . does not explicitly require consideration of the fairness of the defendants’ valuation procedures”
and that “even if Maryland had adopted the [Delaware] approach, the dominant consideration of the
fairness of a transaction remains price”).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 91-97.
256. See Hall v. John Isaacs & Sons Farms, 163 A.2d 288, 293 (Del. 1960); see also Tansey v. Oil
Producing Royalties, Inc., 133 A.2d 141 (Del. Ch. 1957) (dissolving a solvent corporation based on
majority misconduct).
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very limited circumstances.257 It remains to be seen whether the Delaware
courts will join the modern trend.
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.258
provides some hope that liberal, equitable remedies may be available in
Delaware. In this case, the court liberalized appraisal valuation procedures to
bring them into line with modern finance theory.259 Weinberger also
expanded the equitable relief available to remedy breaches of fiduciary duty
in entire fairness cases:
The appraisal remedy we approve may not be adequate in certain
cases, particularly where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing,
deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable
overreaching are involved. Under such circumstances, the
Chancellor’s powers are complete to fashion any form of equitable
and monetary relief as may be appropriate.260
Freezeout schemes in closely held corporations would seem to involve the
types of misconduct identified by Weinberger as justifying expanded
equitable relief. Indeed, such schemes are essentially one large self-dealing
enterprise characterized by “gross and palpable overreaching.”261 Thus,
Weinberger’s liberalizing spirit may expand the bases of equitable relief to
include dissolution for oppression.262
Should the Delaware courts recognize dissolution as an appropriate
remedy for oppression in closely held corporations, there would seem to be
no impediment to allowing a court to decree a buyout of the minority interest
at a fair price in lieu of dissolution. In other states, courts must find that the
statute permitting dissolution for oppression is not an exclusive remedy to
257. Hall v. John Isaacs & Sons Farms, 163 A.2d 288, 293 (Del. 1960) (noting that the power to
dissolve a solvent corporation “is always exercised with great restraint and only upon a showing of
gross mismanagement, positive misconduct by the corporate officers, breach of trust, or extreme
circumstances showing imminent danger of great loss to the corporation”).
258. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
259. See text accompanying notes 215-17.
260. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (citation omitted).
261. Id.
262. In recognizing that a court of equity may order a buyout in lieu of the statutory remedy of
dissolution, one court noted:
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould
each decree to the necessities of the particular case. . . . Whenever a situation exists which is
contrary to the principles of equity and which can be redressed within the scope of judicial action,
a court of equity will devise a remedy to meet the situation though no similar relief has been
granted before.
Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. App. 1988) (citations omitted).
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order a buyout.263 Since Delaware has no such dissolution statute, the power
to decree a buyout would seem to be a lesser included power of any common
law power to decree dissolution for oppression. The buyout remedy is less
harsh than the remedy of dissolution.264 Although a buyout, like dissolution,
gives the minority the ability to exit the enterprise on fair terms, it allows the
majority to continue running the enterprise. Thus, any Delaware court with
the power to decree dissolution for oppression should also have the power to
decree a buyout.
D. Conclusion
In conclusion, the Delaware entire fairness test provides substantial
protection to the minority in a closely held corporation in connection with an
explicit freezeout merger. Application of the entire fairness test to more
subtle freezeout schemes is less clear. In a publicly held corporation, a
freezeout merger is normally the only means to accomplish a freezeout of the
minority interest. Otherwise, the main focus is on the prevention of self-
dealing transactions by the majority. In contrast, in a closely held
corporation, a freezeout can be accomplished as effectively without a
freezeout merger as with one. As a consequence, application of the entire
fairness test to prevent subtle minority freezeouts would represent a natural
development of Delaware law. Similarly, permitting courts to grant
dissolution for oppression, or a buyout in lieu of dissolution, would represent
an extension of Delaware law, but one in accordance with Weinberger’s
liberalizing spirit.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that, despite the pronouncement of Nixon v.
Blackwell that there are no special rules for closely held corporations, the
death of special shareholder duties in Delaware corporations has been greatly
exaggerated. No Delaware case squarely holds that such duties do not exist,
and the most recent Delaware Supreme Court case, Riblet Products Corp. v.
Nagy,265 suggests that Delaware law may provide relief to minority
shareholders in freezeout cases.
If the Delaware courts do not develop special categories of duties to
263. See supra note 95.
264. This is the ground on which courts in jurisdictions with dissolution for oppression statutes
rely in granting a buyout in lieu of dissolution. See, e.g., Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 379 (Tex.
App. 1988).
265. 683 A.2d 37 (Del. 1996).
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protect minority shareholders in closely held corporations, the Delaware
entire fairness test may come to provide similar protection. Despite its
general enabling philosophy, the Delaware courts have vigorously employed
the entire fairness test to defend minority rights in self-dealing cases. In this
regard, the depiction of Delaware as a jurisdiction that favors managerial
flexibility over the rights of individual shareholders is something of a
caricature. The only obstacle that prevents application of the entire fairness
test to freezeout transactions is the definition of the elements of a freezeout
(discharge of the minority, failure to pay dividends, precluding the minority
from participation on the board or management of the enterprise) as a form of
self-dealing. Defining self-dealing in this manner would be in accordance
with the practical realities of closely held corporations.
Should Delaware law come to define the freezeout of a minority
shareholder in a closely held corporation as a breach of fiduciary duty and a
form of shareholder oppression, the Delaware courts will have to consider
the remedies available for such misconduct. A logical development would be
the development of a full range of remedies, including compensatory
monetary relief, preventive injunctive relief, forced dissolution in cases of
serious misconduct, or a buyout of the minority interest at a fair price in lieu
of dissolution.
Should Delaware law develop in the directions suggested in this article,
the modern course of corporate law development will be reversed. Instead of
the rest of the country following Delaware’s lead, Delaware will have
followed the nation’s lead. There is room for hope that Delaware has as
much to learn from the nation as the nation has learned from Delaware.
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